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Abstract
In financial markets, banks play a key role in transforming illiquid assets into more
liquid assets. However, their ability to spread the risk of liquidity shocks over a body
of agents generates a positive probability for non-efficient bank runs. Building off of
the classic Diamond-Dybvig framework, this paper uses an agent based model to
observe the two equilibria, efficient risk sharing and the bank run. While previous
literature has looked at under what conditions could a bank run equilibrium occur,
this proximity based learning model (PBLM) focuses on the development of a panic
driven bank run in light of limited information, proximity based learning, and
localized interactions among heterogeneous agents. This simulation approach is
novel in that it allows for the inclusion of more realistic conditions (e.g.
heterogeneity and learning) that would make such a model difficult to solve, if not
mathematically intractable. This paper finds proximity based learning to be an
effective method of communication and a panic transmission mechanism when
consumers only have limited information.
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Introduction
Banks are able to transform underlying illiquid assets into liquid assets that
are preferable to risk averse consumers. However, this liquidity service comes at the
cost of creating a positive probability of a bank run. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
explored this concept using a framework that would become the standard in bank
run literature. The Proximity Based Learning Model (hereafter referred to as the
PBLM) expands on Diamond and Dybvig’s model (hereafter referred to as the DD
model) by using proximity based learning as an explicit panic transmission
mechanism. This is a clear diverging from the DD model which assumes all
consumers have access to the same information so they can simultaneously panic
and essentially coordinate a bank run. Through the use of proximity based learning,
the PBLM is able to uniquely observe how panic can start at the individual level and
organically develop into a system wide phenomenon.
Since the DD model is discussed throughout this paper both directly and in
comparison to the PBLM, I will now give only brief overview of the DD model. In the
DD model, consumers are each endowed with an illiquid asset that offers a low
return after one period or a high return after two periods. Type 1 consumers will
wish to consume their asset after one period and type 2 consumers prefer to
consume after two periods. Starting in period 0, consumers do not know their type.
Thus they each face “a privately observed, uninsurable risk of being of type 1 or of
type 2.”1 A bank is able to pool these assets and offer a liquid asset that offers a
higher return after one period and a lower return after two periods. Assuming
1

DD (1983) p.405.
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consumers are sufficiently risk averse, banks can create an optimal risk sharing that
provides greater utility to both type 1 and type 2 consumers. However, if a larger
than expected proportion of consumers are identified as being of type 1, the system
is at risk for a bank failure where all consumers attempt to liquidate their asset after
one period regardless of their type.
Each consumer has one opportunity to withdraw assets from the bank after
one period and they do so under the sequential service constraint. They essentially
line up and are served in a random order one at a time until the bank has no more
assets. Any remaining assets are distributed equally among any consumers that
elected not to withdraw in the next period. In the DD model, each consumer is aware
of the intended withdrawals of all other consumers. If enough consumers intend to
withdraw their assets after one period that the bank will not be adequately
endowed for the next period, all consumers are aware of the impending liquidity
shortage. In this case, all consumers will attempt to withdraw assets from the bank
regardless of their type (i.e. type 2 consumers would also attempt to withdraw).
This is considered the bank run equilibrium that “provides allocations that are
worse for all agents than they would have obtained without the bank.”2
The idea that consumers all share the same complete knowledge is criticized
in several other papers as not being realistic. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) build off
of the DD model but instead have investors “observe noisy signals” regarding the
fundamentals of the economy.3 All noisy signals are based off of fundamentals, but
there is no communication between investors regarding the different signals.
2
3

DD (1983) p.409.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) p.1294.
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Goldstein and Pauzner find that the noisy signals can give investors incorrect
expectations regarding the state of the system and actually lead to bank runs
“even when the economic environment is sufficiently strong that depositors
would not have run had they thought other depositors would not run.”4
This idea of a panic or run occurring even though fundamentals were strong will be
referred to in the PBLM as unnecessary. Goldstein and Pauzner determine the
“probability of panic-based runs and relate it to the [banking] contract.”5 They find
that the more risk sharing created by the banking contract, the greater the
probability of a bank run.
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) use an idea where if a group of consumers
withdrawing was unusually large, “uninformed individuals will be misled and will
precipitate a run on the bank.”6 This is consistent with the popularized idea of the
Great Depression where observing long lines outside of banks made consumers
nervous about the possibility of bank failures and thus inspired them to join the line
and also withdraw their money. Not only would this increase liquidity strains on
banks, the line would get longer encouraging even more individuals to panic. Chari
and Jagannathan found the above idea could lead to bank runs “even if no one has
any adverse information about future returns.”7 In their study, these unnecessary
panics impose social costs as well as liquidation costs.

Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) p. 1295.
Ibid
6 Chari and Jagannathan (1988) p. 749.
7 Chari and Jagannathan (1988) p. 759.
4
5
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A key differentiator between the PBLM and the other studies that have been
mentioned is the focus the PBLM places on the panic transmission process.8 The
PBLM uses learning where consumers have the opportunity to gather information
from their peers. A consumer then uses that information to form beliefs about the
state of the system. Consumers use these “ad-hoc expectations” that are not entirely
rational to then make decisions regarding panics. For example, Consumer A might
look at his neighbors and see they are all withdrawing large sums from the bank.
Consumer A would use that information to infer that overall liquidity demands on
the bank are so high that Consumer A panics and withdraws his money too because
he thinks the bank might fail. Consumer A’s decision to panic will affect any other
consumer that observes him. Thus readers can see how the learning process allows
information to spread in a social network like manner.
Kelly and O Grada (2000) conducted an empirical study based on this
“Idea of market panics spreading through social contagion—where
individuals hear some bad news and communicate it to their acquaintances, who
pass it on in turn, leading to a market panic.”9
They looked at two bank runs that occurred in a New York bank in the 1850s. Using
old marriage records and large amounts of background information on depositors,
Kelly and O Grada were able to reconstruct the social networks of account holders of
the bank. They found “the most important factor in whether they [depositors]
panicked…was county of origin.”10 This was indicative of the social network
structure of many of the Irish immigrant depositors. Using a social network as a
See Proximity Based Learning Section for details.
Kelly and O Grada (2000) p. 1110.
10 Kelly and O Grada (2000) p. 1123.
8
9
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source of information and communication like the PBLM does through learning is
supported by the empirical results found by Kelly and O Grada.
The reason this project is significant is that bank runs are bad. Bernanke
(1983) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) found that bank runs imposed huge
costs on the U.S. economy in the 1930s. Diamond and Dybvig also argue
“runs are costly and reduce social welfare by interrupting production (when loans
are called) and by destroying optimal risk sharing among depositors.”11
While bank runs can be inevitable if initial withdrawals are large enough, bank runs
can also develop if consumers unnecessarily panic due to what Goldstein and
Pauzner call bad expectations. All of the studies mentioned thus far indicate panic
create panic. Thus enough unnecessary panics can actually increase liquidity
demands on a system to the point where it will fail when it should not have had
consumers not been fearing a panic. The PBLM uses learning so that the panic
transmission process can actually be modeled in a way where factors that affect the
probability of unnecessary panics can be identified.12
Learning allows the PBLM to identify how the spread of panic at the
individual level can translate into patterns on a larger scale. While consumers
technically panic individually in the DD model, they all share the same information
and draw the same conclusion at the same time. Either no one panics in the DD
model (the good risk sharing equilibrium) or everyone panics and the bank fails (the
bad bank run equilibrium). The DD does not provide for any middle ground where
DD (1983) p.403.
Panics are bad in very similar ways to bank runs. Using terminology of the DD
model, a type 2 consumer could unnecessarily panic and withdraw her assets after
one period. This would be an inefficient outcome given that she could have held the
asset longer and received a higher payout.

11
12
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some consumers may panic but others may not. The PBLM is able to provide this
middle ground when consumers have only limited information to act upon. Further,
this information is transmitted to and from a social network like process like what
was empirically supported by Kelly and O Grada regarding two bank runs in the
1850s. The PBLM applies this idea of networking via proximity based learning to the
standard DD framework. The results of this study support that proximity based
learning is an effective method of panic transmission in light of limited information.
The results are also consistent with the idea that increasing risk sharing increases
the probability of bank failures. Most importantly, this paper finds that information
from limited sample sizes can cause consumers to inaccurately diagnose system
fundamentals so increasing the visibility in the system can prevent costly,
unnecessary panics.

11

Model Overview
The PBLM is essentially the DD model repeated continuously. This will be made
clearer in following sections. In each time period the following actions are executed
in the order below.

All consumers execute each action in a random order. E.g. all consumers move in
some random order. Then all consumers discover their net income in a random
order. The order can change from action to action and period to period.

1.

Consumers move – Consumers randomly move around the bank.

2.

Bank pays operating cost if period > 0

3.

Consumers discover net income for period
If net income is positive, it is deposited it into the bank.
If net income is negative, the consumer withdraws assets from
the bank to cover deficit.

4.

Consumers perform proximity based learning
Consumers can decide to panic and withdraw all their assets from the
bank.

5.

Consumers pay back deficits

6.

Consumers go bankrupt if they have an unpaid deficit

7.

Bank goes bankrupt if it was unable to meet any obligations

8.

Consumer and bank assets grow

12

Consumer Net Income Overview
In the beginning of each time period, each consumer earns income Yi,t,
consumes a fixed proportion of that income Ci,t, and faces a positive probability of a
negative monetary shock Xi,t. Together, in each period, these three variables
determine each consumer’s net income Ii,t which is described by
1.

Ii,t = Yi,t – Ci,t – Xi,t

Consumer Gross Income
Each consumer’s income is randomly drawn from a truncated normal
distribution with mean Yi*.13 In doing this, the PBLM breaks away from the common
modeling assumption that incomes are standard across all agents. This is important
in that the agents here are consumers that almost certainly have varying incomes in
real life. Further, this increased heterogeneity plays out in meaningful ways as
consumers have interactions that depend on their levels of wealth and net incomes.
To be exact, each consumer’s income in a single period is randomly drawn
from that consumer’s normally distributed income curve. This is to reflect possible
fluctuations in areas such as hours worked or bonuses accrued such that a
consumer’s income is not necessarily constant over time. A consumer’s income
curve is identical from period to period to represent the assumption that a
consumer’s income is consistent over time. The consumer’s income curve is
determined as soon as the consumer is instantiated. However, the mean of each
13

The distribution is truncated so that consumers only have positive incomes.
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consumer’s income curve is initially and singularly randomly drawn from a
truncated normal distribution with mean Y*.14 This step generates the heterogeneity
in consumer income curves.

Consumer Consumption
When consumers are instantiated and their income curves determined, their
level of consumption for the entire simulation is also determined. Each consumer’s
level of consumption is individually and randomly drawn from the same truncated
normal distribution with mean γ* and remains constant throughout the model.15,16
Similar to the way each consumer’s income curve has a mean initially drawn from a
random distribution, this further adds to the level of heterogeneity into the model in
a way representative of actual consumers and meaningful in consumer interactions.
Where a consumer’s income in the period t can be described by Yi,t and the
consumer’s rate of consumption is γi, the consumer’s consumption Cit is described
by
2.

Ci,t = γi(Yi,t)

An analogous argument to the one above regarding the consistent but not
constant incomes of consumers could be made about their levels of consumption.
However, what are most important to this model are the varying levels of wealth

Hence the expected mean of every consumer’s income curve is Y* before they are
instantiated.
15 The distribution is truncated so that no consumer’s level of consumption is
greater than 1 or less than 0.
16 The expected level of consumption for each consumer is γ* before they are
instantiated.
14
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and net income. Both of these are already significantly affected by varying one’s
income from period to period. While drawing a consumer’s level of consumption
each period would certainly add to the model’s heterogeneity, it does not do so in a
way not already captured by the model.17 For the sake of simplicity, each
consumer’s level of consumption is assumed to be constant over time.

Consumer Negative Shocks
Each consumer also faces a positive probability λ of a negative monetary
shock in each period. These shocks are idiosyncratic and proportional to the
consumer’s income in the period.18 Where the proportion of the shock to the
consumer’s income is Ψ > 0, the monetary value of the shock for a consumer in
period t Xit can be described by
3.

X!! =

0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟
−Ψ 𝑌!" 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟

It could be argued that varying income alone creates much of the heterogeneity
needed in the model and that consumption could be constant across all consumers
and time periods. However, the benefits of making consumers more heterogeneous
in this manner were deemed to outweigh the cost of making programmatic changes
to the simulation.
18 Much thought was given as to whether or not there should also be systemic
shocks in the model. A systemic shock would be interesting, especially given recent
financial crises. However, accurately reflecting the fear of a systemic shock in each
consumer’s decision to panic is not a simple task nor is adding a systemic shock to
the simulation at all. There also arose the question of the place of a systemic shock
in the overall significance of the model. The two main panic conditions compare
liquidity demands to the bank’s capitalization and the idea of panic directly leading
to more panic. A systemic shock would have an impact on both as it would push
liquidity demands even higher, causing consumers to panic which, causes
consumers to panic. But it does not clearly add a new element of panic to the model
as it is currently designed. If this model were designed to analyze optimization
behavior, a systemic shock could have greater meaning depending on how risk
aversion was defined in the consumers.
17
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This shock is large enough such that when it occurs, it is larger than the consumer’s
expected savings (income – consumption).19 Thus the consumer will experience
negative net income or a deficit when a shock occurs.
The probability of the shock occurring, λ, and the proportion of the shock to
the consumer’s income, Ψ, are constant across all consumers for the entire
simulation. As mentioned previously, an argument that these should have been
idiosyncratic and possibly fluctuating from period to period could have been made.
However, the heterogeneity in income is sufficient for this model such that λ and Ψ
can be held constant for the sake of simplicity.
This shock could be thought of as a medical emergency or any type of large
unforeseen expense. It mirrors the DD in which consumers do not know whether
they are type I or type II consumers until they need to make a liquidity decision. In
the PBLM, consumers need extra liquidity should they be struck by a shock in the
period. The random nature of the shock is essential in creating private risk for
consumers. Further, this shock is directly uninsurable.20 “An investor cannot buy
direct insurance against his need for liquidity, because the need is private
information” and thus unobservable.21 This risk creates the risk-averse consistent
behaviors at the cores of both the DD model and the PBLM.22

It will later be shown that λΨ > 1 – γ* in order to keep the system stationary.
See Diamond and Dybvig page 403 for a full explanation as to why this shock is
uninsurable.
21 Diamond (2007) p.190.
22 Diamond (2007) calls this the uncertain horizon of holding the asset. Consumers
are able to hold an asset that yields a higher return if held for two periods as
opposed to just one period. This idea will be elaborated on in more detail later.
19
20
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Consumer Net Income
A consumer’s net income Ii,t is determined by the consumer’s income, the
consumer’s consumption, and whether or not a shock is experienced. Since all these
variables have consistent expected values over time, E[Ii,s] = E[Ii,t] for any periods s,t.
In any period for a specific consumer, the expectation of Ii can be written in terms of
Yi as shown below
4.

E[Ii] = E[Yi](1- γi – λΨ)

Note that before the model is created and consumers are instantiated, all consumers
are expected to be identical so the subscript for the consumer can be dropped. The
expectation of any consumer’s net income in any period is
5.

E[I] = Y*(1 – γ* – λΨ)

In a later section, E[I] will be shown to be crucial in keeping the expected level of
wealth in the overall system constant over time.
If a consumer has net income such that Ii,t > 0, they can invest Ii,t in an asset
with a two-tiered return (a low return if held for one period or a high return if held
for two periods) and carry these savings into the future. A consumer will earn
positive net income if they do not experience a negative shock since Xi,t = 0. In this
case,
Ii,t = Yi,t – Ci,t
Ii,t = Yi,t – γi Yi,t
Ii,t = Yi,t (1 - γi)
6.

Ii,t > 0

where 0 < γi < 1

17
If a consumer has net income such that Ii,t < 0, the deficit must be paid back in
the current period through accumulated savings; otherwise the consumer goes
bankrupt and must leave the simulation. As mentioned above, this deficit occurs
when a consumer experiences a negative shock.
The heterogeneity in the net incomes of consumers allows for the
observation of heterogeneous consumer interactions and how those interactions
can lead to bank panics.

18

Underlying Asset
At the heart of this model is an illiquid riskless asset. The illiquid asset here is
defined as one that yields a high return if it is held for a long period or a low return
if it is only held for a short period. If the asset were held for zero periods, it would
simply return its face value (or purchase price). This asset is illiquid because its
early liquidation value is less than its full maturation value.
Diamond and Dybvig attribute the illiquidity of the asset to a number of
possible reasons. It could be that the asset “provides low levels of output per unit of
input if operated for a single period but high levels of output if operated for two
periods”23 or there are selling costs when consumers are “unexpectedly forced to
‘liquidate’ early.”24 The exact nature of the illiquidity is immaterial to both the DD
model and the PBLM so long as the asset is illiquid. The real cost of early liquidation
makes bank panics that “are costly and reduce social welfare by interrupting
production (when loans are called) and by destroying optimal risk sharing among
depositors.”25 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) found that bank runs in the 1930s
imposed large costs on the United States economy.
The PBLM illiquid asset is in the same vein as that of the DD model. The asset
has a price of 1 and can be purchased fractionally and in unlimited quantities.26 The

DD (1983) pp.402-403.
Ibid
25 Ibid
26 The supply of assets is infinite and exogenous to the system. For the sake of this
model, banks are also able to invest in this underlying asset. This allows banks a
greater level of autonomy needed to operate in an environment with an unbounded
number of periods. It is unclear whether or not this type of operation would be
permissible in the original DD model. In the DD model, consumers provide the
23
24
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illiquid asset here yields a full maturity return βb if it is held for two periods, or a
lower return αb if the asset is liquidated before maturity after only one period. The
holding duration does not need to be determined a priori and the return is
determined solely by the holding duration. The PBLM returns follow the inequality
!

βb > 1 and βb > αb > 0. The lower the ratio !! (ceteris paribus), the more illiquid the
!

asset. Further,
7.

βb > αb 2

The above indicates that the holder of the asset receives a greater payoff for holding
the asset for two periods consecutively as opposed to holding it for one period,
liquidating it, and then reinvesting it for a second period. Thus there exists a real
penalty for liquidating the asset before full maturity. The cost of liquidating an asset
after one period instead of two is the difference in returns, so it has a value of
8.

βb - αb > 0

From hereafter, this underlying asset will also be referred to as the bank
asset. The reasoning for this new name will be fully described in the next section. In
essence, this is the asset that banks hold and use to offer a more liquid asset that a
sufficiently risk-averse consumer would prefer.

underlying assets for the bank. However, this could easily be the case of the bank
having no initial endowment so it is unable to obtain any assets independently of
receiving deposits from consumers. Thus the ability of the bank to obtain assets
directly should it have the resources appears to be a natural extension of the DD
model. The supply of assets is abstracted away in the DD model so it will be handled
similarly in the PBLM.

20

Consumer Asset
Diamond found “sufficiently risk-averse investors, but not risk-neutral
investors, are willing to give up some expected return to get a more liquid asset.”27
“Sufficiently” depends on the differences between the full maturity and the early
liquidation returns as well as the probability of the negative shock occurring.28 The
negative shock has already been identified as not directly insurable due to its
unobservable nature. However, banks are able to pool the underlying assets and
create a more liquid asset that provides more utility to sufficiently risk-averse
consumers.29 “In this role, banks can be viewed as providing [indirect] insurance
that allows agents to consume when they need to most.”30
This more liquid asset will be referred to as the consumer asset since it will
effectively be the only asset consumers hold via the bank.31 Let the consumer asset
yield a full maturity return of βc if held for two periods, or a lower return of αc if the
asset is liquidated before maturity after only one period. All rules applied to the
underlying asset still apply to the consumer asset. Thus βc > αc > 0 and βc > αc2 and
Diamond (2007) p.192.
This statement should be analyzed by observing the decisions investors make to
optimize their returns. The problem of optimization is beyond the scope of this
paper as it would require much more complex decision making rules than what the
PBLM currently uses. More specifically, the optimizing consumer would most likely
not choose to invest all of his or her resources into the liquid asset as this would
expose the consumer to a positive probability of a bank run. Calculating this
probability is likely intractable in a model as dynamic as the PBLM but it would be
necessary for a consumer to optimize. Instead the consumer would invest a portion
of their assets in the riskless underlying asset directly and hold the other portion in
the bank’s liquid asset.
29 Diamond (2007) pp.191-192. Diamond provides a concrete example where this is
true .
30 DD (1983) p.405.
31 The underlying asset is called the bank asset by this same reasoning.
27
28
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the real penalty for liquidating the consumer asset before full maturity has a value
of
9.

βc - αc > 0.

Since this consumer asset is more liquid than the bank asset,
10.

!!
!!

>

!!
!!

Essentially, the bank takes the relatively illiquid underlying asset and creates
a new asset with a higher return after one period, but a lower return after two
periods compared to the underlying asset. Mathematically, this statement means
11.

βb > βc

12.

αb < αc.

This allows consumers to access the higher two period return after just one period
should they suffer a negative shock and need extra liquidity. This set of the bank
asset returns and consumer asset returns can be thought of as the banking contract
or demand deposit contract between banks and consumers.
Notice that when consumers liquidate their assets after a single period, the
bank experiences a real loss with a value of αc - αb > 0. When consumers wait until
their assets fully mature, the bank earns a real profit with value βb - βc > 0.32 In the
DD model, the bank is a mutual bank meaning that consumers “not withdrawing in
period 1 get a pro rata share of the bank’s assets in period 2.”33 While this is

It will be discussed later, but this mismatch of returns exposes all agents to bank
failures.
33 DD (1983) p.408. The banks return all profits to the consumers. This would mean
a type 2 consumer receives either no return in the event of a bank failure or a return
equal to the bank’s remaining assets divided by the number of type 2 consumers.
32
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certainly reasonable for a 3 period (single cycle) model, it does not make sense for a
model with an unbounded number of periods. In the PBLM, banks carry over any
profits from period to period and reinvest them to better meet any future
obligations.34
In the PBLM, banks are not able to provide this liquidity service without cost.
Each bank must pay an amount D > 0 each period. This can be considered as the
operating cost of the bank. This is not unreasonable, as one would expect such a
system to at least need a highly capable teller handling consumer deposits and
withdrawals.35
This operating cost does not exist in the DD model, but it is not a significant
change to the model. As described in the previous paragraph and footnote 33, this
would be a decrease in the bank’s worth after period 1. This would simply lead to
slightly lower returns to type 2 consumers in a way that does not thematically
change the model. This will be made clearer in the following section on DD
equilibria.

There are also other DD assumptions made about each consumer initially having the
same endowment and they only liquidate their assets in their entirety.
34 See footnote 15 for an explanation on why PBLM banks are able to directly invest
in the underlying asset.
35 DD (1983) elected to make the underlying asset illiquid through the imposition of
some unknown cost in a perfectly logical manner. That same logic is now also being
applied to the banks in that operating banks should not be cost free.

23

Diamond and Dybvig Equilibria
Diamond and Dybvig Tipping Point
In the DD model, if a large enough proportion of the consumer population
elects to withdraw their consumer assets after just one period, the bank cannot
possibly meet all of its obligations, as the value of its assets will be less than the
value of its liabilities. Consider the case where 100 consumers each have $1 so they
collectively deposit $100 into the bank. After one period, the bank’s assets have a
present value of αb($100) but liabilities with a present value of αc($100) and αb < αc.
If the proportion of type 1 consumers, who fully withdraw their money from the
bank after one period, T1, is large enough such that
13.

β! =

!! ( !! ! !! !! )
!! (!!!! )

< α!

36

the bank will fail. If βc < αc, all consumers, not just type 1 consumers, have an
incentive to withdraw their assets after one period instead of waiting another
period to receive a lower return. Thus all consumers would attempt to withdraw
their money after one period.
Essentially, bank runs occur any time that withdrawals in period one are too
large. At this point, the bank’s leftover assets are so small that when they are evenly
distributed among the remaining consumers in period two, those consumers receive
a return less than what they could have received from the bank after just one period,
αc. Thus the benefit of waiting an additional period to receive returns is now
This follows the idea that type 2 consumers receive a pro rata share of the bank’s
remaining assets as described previously. The operating cost mentioned in the
previous section would decrease the total remaining assets for the bank (the
numerator) such that consumers would receive a lower βc.
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negative so all consumers would attempt to withdraw their money after one period
regardless of their type.

Sequential Service Constraint
Both the DD and PBLM operate under the sequential service constraint. In
Diamond and Dybvig’s words, this means
“Withdrawal tenders are served sequentially in random order until the bank
runs out of assets. This approach allows us to capture the flavor of continuous time
(in which depositors deposit and withdraw at different random times) in a discrete
model.”37
Consider Consumer A and Consumer B waiting in line to withdraw their
money from the bank. If Consumer A withdraws the last $10 of the bank’s assets,
Consumer B and every consumer after him will receive nothing from the bank and
lose their entire savings. Thus if consumers realize that their collective withdrawals
are large enough38 relative to the value of the bank’s assets, they have an incentive
to withdraw all of their money from the bank regardless of their personal liquidity
needs.39 This is how Diamond and Dybvig and the PBLM define a consumer
panicking.40
In the DD model, at the tipping proportion of type 1 consumers T1 (described
above) or any proportion larger than T1, all consumers panic and make a run on the

DD (1983) p.408.
“Large enough” as defined by the tipping point mentioned earlier.
39 Consumers do not want to be the last ones holding that hot potato that is a
worthless IOU.
40 This idea of panicking will be addressed more thoroughly later in this paper.
37
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bank, causing a bank failure.41 This tipping point is unavoidable due to the nature of
an effective banking contract. “A demand deposit contract which is not subject to
runs provides no liquidity services.”42 As long as the liquidities of the underlying
asset and asset offered to consumers do not perfectly match, there exists a positive
probability of a bank run since in theory all consumers could elect to redeem all
assets at the higher bank return which is greater than the actual return of the assets.
Extending this idea to the PBLM, the tipping point is deemed to be when the
bank’s assets are not sufficient to cover expected obligations in the next period (and
the current period too). At this point, consumers expect the bank to be unable to
service all withdrawal requests in the immediate future. In this situation, consumers
will panic and withdraw their money early to avoid being among those consumers
that will lose all assets when the bank fails.
Diamond and Dybvig call this the bank run equilibrium. It “provides
allocations that are worse for all agents than they would have obtained without the
bank (trading in the competitive market)” because “all production is interrupted at
T = 1 when it is optimal for some to continue until T =2.”43 Further, any consumers
that are not served by the time the bank runs out of assets receive no return at all
and lose the entire value of their initial investment.
If the tipping point of withdrawals is not reached, consumers will not panic
and there will be no bank run. Diamond and Dybvig refer to this as the efficient risk
This idea of all consumers panicking together will be explored more in depth. This
idea makes the terms bank panics and bank failures synonymous in the DD as
consumers only panic if the bank is going to fail and if the bank is going to fail,
consumers panic.
42 DD (1983) p.409.
43 Ibid
41
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sharing or good equilibrium. In this outcome, the consumers that needed the extra
liquidity were able to obtain it and the consumers that were not shocked are able to
tap into the higher full maturity return of their investment while still having
protected themselves from the potential shock.
It is interesting to note that the sequential service constraint is actually only
present in period 1 of the DD model. The idea of the pro-rata share eliminates the
sequential service constraint in period 2. This change is unaddressed by Diamond
and Dybvig. However, it is reflective of their uses of mutual banks, a “flexible”
banking contract, an abstraction of true risk-aversion and optimization, the fact that
there are exactly 3 periods, and homogeneity assumptions about consumers. Under
the assumption that the banks are mutual banks, it is logical that each consumer
should receive a pro-rata share of assets assuming they put in the same amount
initially as Diamond and Dybvig assume. The flexibility of the banking contract is
shown in equation 13.44 The full maturity return consumers expect, βc, does not
actually have a definite value. βc is essentially a function of the proportion of
consumers that are type 1.
If the consumers were promised at least an actual value for βc (let it be βc*),
the tipping point would change to
14.

!! ( !! ! !! !! )
!! (!!!! )

< β∗!

This would reflect the fact that even if the pro rata share of bank assets in period 2 is
larger than αc, each consumer would be entitled to βc* > αc. Thus the pro rata share

There is no strict value of β! . It is simply the pro-rata share of all leftover assets in
period 2. It is considered flexible because it depends on withdrawals in period 1.
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must be at least βc* as is reflected in equation 14. If the pro rata share were between
αc and βc* exclusive, under the sequential service constraint at least one consumer
would not receive the full βc*.45 Hence, consumers correctly fearing that they might
not receive a return after two periods would panic in period 1 and withdraw all
their money then.46
The pro-rata return is certainly reasonable given that the DD model only has
three periods. After period 2, the model ends so the bank, consumers, and assets all
disappear. However, in the PBLM where there is an unbounded number of possible
periods, consumers must have a definite full maturity return. The idea of a pro rata
return does not fit a model where assets can carry over from period to period. This
carryover prevents the PBLM from having any rest points similar to period 2 in the
DD model. Without a defined stopping point, there can be no final distribution of
assets.
Since the PBLM model extends the number of periods in the DD model, it is
only natural that the idea of a pro rata return be replaced by a definite full maturity
return. This extension is reflected in comparisons of the new tipping point in
equation 14 and the old tipping point in equation 13. Both reflect the idea that
consumers have behaviors that are consistent with risk aversion and utility
All consumers would attempt to receive a share of βc*. Under the sequential
service constraint, all consumers would receive the full βc* so long as the bank had
the assets. By the pigeonhole principle, this necessitates that at least one consumer
would receive a share less than βc*.
46 This statement is somewhat untrue given that true risk aversion does not exist in
the model. The impetus for seeking to avoid losing one’s money implies that there is
some utility possibly derived from having money. Although that utility function is
not defined in the PBLM (or DD in specific terms), consumers behave consistently
with risk aversion (i.e. they derive some utility from holding money so they seek to
avoid losing it in a bank failure).
45
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maximization in their given situations.47 Incorporating the bank’s operating cost D
into equation 14 yields the first form of the PBLM tipping point proportion T1*
15.

!! ( !! ! !! !! !!)
!! (!!!! )

< β∗!
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Risk Averse Behavior
In the DD model, consumers are risk averse. The important result of their
risk aversion is that if consumers are of type 1 (analogous to being shocked in the
PBLM), they prematurely withdraw their money from the bank because their utility
function is only dependent on consumption in period 1. “If investors were not risk
averse and had constant marginal utility of consumption, they would not prefer” to
hold the more liquid asset.49 Diamond and Dybvig derive mathematically how under
certain assumptions about the utility functions of consumers, a sufficiently liquid
asset is desirable. However, the exact level of or definition of risk aversion is not
important to fundamental structure of the model as long as it is known to exist.50
In the PBLM, the desire to avoid bankruptcy makes consumers risk averse.
An unpaid deficit would mean bankruptcy which means the consumer is forced to
leave the simulation. Thus consumers are willing to liquidate any assets to pay off

i.e. consumers want to avoid getting a lower return than what is sensible in the
case of DD or than what is guaranteed in the case of the PBLM.
48 It will later be shown that the PBLM tipping point is different from equation 15
due to the relaxation of several DD assumptions and differences in the models.
49 Diamond (2007) p.192. Although Diamond says this about a concrete example, it
is widely applicable to these banking contracts.
50 See footnote 28.
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deficits regardless of the maturities of those assets.51 Therefore consumers prefer
the more liquid asset.52 This risk averse behavior even drives them to accept a lower
expected return over finite periods of time through the consumer asset as opposed
to holding the higher yield underlying asset directly.53
In the DD model, the idea of risk aversion and optimization is somewhat
abstracted away. They note that
“[Sufficiently risk averse] agents will choose to deposit at least some of their
wealth in the bank even if they anticipate a positive probability of a run, provided
that the probability is small enough, because the good equilibrium dominates
holding assets directly.”54
They do not attempt to identify what portion of wealth consumers would deposit in
the bank or what portion consumers would hold directly in underlying assets. That
question is beyond the scope of their model. True risk aversion and optimization
will also be considered beyond the scope of the PBLM.55 While the PBLM does not

A risk averse consumer’s utility function in the PBLM could be one in which utility
is dependent on how many periods the consumer survives in the simulation. Hence
in each period, the consumer maximizes his utility by liquidating any assets
necessary to prevent bankruptcy and extend his stimulation time. He also
maximizes utility by carrying as much assets into the next period so as to pay off
future deficits. Thus it is in the PBLM consumer’s best interest to pay off deficits and
avoid bank failure so he can have as much money as possible.
52 Again, this statement could be proved mathematically with defined risk aversion.
The PBLM assumes risk averse consistent behavior such that this is true.
53 Over infinite periods of time, the expected returns are both infinite.
54 DD (1983) p.409-410.
55 The PBLM consumer’s panic conditions are not based on truly rational
expectations. Consumers have ad-hoc expectations based largely on their personal
information as well as whatever they glean from their proximity based learning.
This idea is consistent with the fact that consumers are often not perfectly rational
but act logically according to what they can feasibly comprehend.
51
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have explicit risk aversion, consumers’ behaviors and ad hoc expectations are
consistent with risk aversion.56

Short Term Assets and Long Term Assets57
From this point on, both consumer and bank assets that have been held for
zero periods will be referred to as short term assets. Both consumer and bank assets
that have been held for one period will be referred to as long term assets. When long
term assets are held for an additional period (two periods total), they are converted
into short term assets at β times face value where they are then considered to have
been held for zero periods.
In the previously defined consumer asset, when a consumer has invested her
$100 into the underlying asset in period t, she is now said to hold $100 in short term
assets which can be liquidated in period t for $100. In period t+1, these short term
assets are rolled over into long term assets with the original face value of $100.
These long term assets can be liquidated in period t+1 for α($100) where α is the
return on consumer assets held for one period. If the consumer holds those long
term assets for an additional period, they are converted back into short term assets
at β times the face value of $100 so she now has short term assets with face value
β($100) in period t + 2 where β is the return on consumer assets held for two
periods. These “new” short term assets are treated like any other short term assets
so she could liquidate them at their face value of β($100).
Ad hoc expectations are discussed in the Proximity Based Learning section.
In this section, the subscripts on the asset returns are dropped. The principles
described are applicable to both consumer assets and bank assets.
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This change from the original asset terminology to the new short term assets
and long term assets may seem unnecessary upon first glance. However, from a
programmatic sense, short term and long term assets are much easier to manage
than a single asset with a two-tiered set of returns.58 Also, this new terminology
better fits a system with an unbounded number of periods as opposed to the DD
model which had exactly three periods.
If one were to extend the DD model as the PBLM does, in the third period, the
underlying asset after being held for two periods would just be liquidated at β times
the original face value and then reinvested as new underlying assets with face value
β times the original face value. Upon reaching maturity in the third period, the
underlying asset is really just treated like the consumer’s initial endowment in the
first period which was only worth its face value. This has the same effect as holding
long term assets for an additional period and then converting those long term assets
into short term assets at β times face value. Thus the short term/long term system is
a natural extension of the original DD model to the PBLM which has additional
periods.
The table on the next page indicates the analogs between the original
terminology and the new terminology. Notice that the liquidation or present values
for holdings in the same row are equivalent. The liquidation values capture the
present worth of the assets, thus the holdings in the same rows are equivalent.

58

It is really a three-tiered system if one includes liquidating after 0 periods.
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Table 0: Asset Conversions
Face Value
Liquidation
Value
Holding
$100
$100
$100 in
underlying
assets for 0
periods
Holding
$100
α($100)
$100 in
underlying
assets for 1
period
Holding
$100
β($100)
$100 in
underlying
assets for 2
periods

Face Value
Holding
$100 in
short term
assets

$100

Liquidation
Value
$100

Holding
$100 in
long term
assets

$100

α($100)

Holding β
($100) in
short term
assets

β($100)

β($100)

Table 0 describes the analogs between original asset terminology and short term
and long term asset.
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Asset Liquidation59
As mentioned in the previous section on consumer net income, consumers
face the possibility of a negative monetary shock in any period. Hence they may
need resources now to pay off any deficit in the current period. An event of this
nature could cause the consumer to liquidate a portion of their assets after just one
period even though they would have to pay the aforementioned early liquidation
penalty.60 However, the utility-maximizing consumer would always attempt to
liquidate any short term assets before liquidating any long term assets.61
Consider the following example where Consumer A has short term assets
with a face value of $100, long term assets with a face value of $100, and a deficit of
$40 in the current period. Let long term assets be liquidated at 1.1 times their face
value and converted into short term assets at 1.4 times their face value if held for an
additional period. If Consumer A first liquidates her short term assets, she must cash
in short term assets with a face value of $40 (present value of $40), leaving her with
short term assets with a face value of $60 and long term assets with a face value of
$100. In the next period excluding any net income, Consumer A has short term
assets with a face value of $140 and long term assets with a face value of $60 for a
total present value of $224.
Now suppose Consumer A had first liquidated her long term assets. To do so
she must have cashed in long term assets with a face value of $36.36 (present value
In this section, the subscripts on the asset returns are dropped. The principles
described are applicable to both consumer assets and bank assets.
60 See Equation 9.
61 This is consistent with the rough description of risk aversion in the PBLM in
footnote 51.
59
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of $40), leaving her with short term assets with a face value of $100 and long term
assets with a face value of $63.64. In the next period excluding any net income,
Consumer A has short term assets with a face value of $89.10 and long term assets
with a face value of $100 for a total present value of $199.10.
The example above highlights the real benefit of liquidating one’s most liquid
assets (their short term assets) before one’s less liquid assets (their long term
assets). This benefit holds because the marginal benefit of holding short term assets
with a face value of $1 an additional period is α - 1 whereas holding long term assets
with a face value of $1 an additional period has a marginal benefit of β – α. β – α is
always greater than α – 1 as long as β > 1, β > α > 0, and β > α2, the two previously
stated conditions on the asset returns.62
This concept will now be explained algebraically in the context of the PBLM.
Suppose Consumer A has short term assets with face value St and long term assets
with face value Lt. Consumer A is shocked and has negative net income It in period t.
She first attempts to offset her net income It with her short term assets St. If |It| ≤ St,
then the consumer’s remaining short term assets are St + It. If |It| < St, the consumer
initially uses all of her short term assets such that she has 0 short term assets
remaining and a leftover deficit of St + It. She then attempts to pay the leftover deficit
by liquidating any long term assets at a rate of αc times their face value. Hence the
consumer must liquidate |St + It| / αc in face value of long term assets to pay the
deficit. If she has fewer than |St + It| / αc in face value of long term assets, she

See the section on underlying asset returns. The proof is simple if the
substitutions βb = 1 + β and αb = 1 + α are plugged into equation 7.
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liquidates all of her long term assets to pay off as much of the deficit as she can
before she will later go bankrupt in the period.
Similarly, banks also choose to liquidate their short term assets before any
long term assets to pay off any obligations.

Asset Conversions63
Consumers are able to invest any net positive income into their bank. In any
period t, a consumer’s net income, Ii,t, is described by
16.

Ii,t = Yi,t – Ci,t – Xi,t

Ii,t can be considered as the first part of the potential change in a consumer’s short
term assets in period t. Should the consumer hold any long term assets in period t-1,
in period t, those assets are converted into short term assets at the long term return
β. However, any long term assets held in period t-1 would necessitate that the same
face value amount of short term assets had been held in period t-2. Hence in period
t, the total amount of short term assets, Ji,t, is described recursively by
17.

Ji,t = Ii,t + β(Ji,t-2) for t ≥ 2
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For periods 0 and 1, let L* be the consumer’s initial face value endowment of long
term assets. Let S* be the consumer’s initial face value endowment of short term
assets, so we have
18.

Ji,0 = Ii,0 + S*

In this section, the subscripts on the asset returns are dropped. The principles
described are applicable to both consumer assets and bank assets.
64 This only holds if J ≥ 0 for all t. E[J ] > 0 for all t.
t
t
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19.

Ji,1 = Ii,1 + β (L*)
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Any short term assets held in the previous period are rolled over into long
term assets in the current period. Thus the total amount of long term assets in
period t, Li,t, can be described by
20.

Li,t = Ji,t-1 for t ≥ 1

66

Since short term assets are liquidated at face value and long term assets can
be liquidated in the current period at the short term return α, the present value of a
consumer’s total assets in period t, Ki,t, is described by
Ki,t = α(Lt) + β(Ji,t-2) + Ii,t for t ≥ 2, substituting equation 20 yields
21.

Ki,t = α(Ji,t-1) + Ji,t for t ≥ 2
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For periods 0 and 1,
22.

Ki,0 = Ii,0 + S* + α (L*)

23.

Ki,1 = Ii,1 + α(J0) + β (L*)

with the substitution in equation 18

Although subscripts indicating that these are values specific to each consumer are
included, the expectation of each consumer’s attributes are identical before the
consumers are instantiated. Thus the subscripts indicating the consumer can be
dropped when expectations are taken. The time subscript on net income could also
be dropped as described in the Net Income section.
Bank assets convert similarly to the consumer assets using the bank rates
instead of the consumer rates.
There is no subscript on either initial endowment as it will be the same for every
consumer.
66 Assuming J
i,t-1 ≥ 0. If Ji,t-1 < 0, Li,t = 0;
67 Assuming J
i,t-1 ≥ 0.
65
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Stationarity
This section discusses the expectations of numerous variables under the
condition of stationarity. To simplify the notation, let the expectations of any
variables be denoted by italics. The expectations of each variable are taken before
the consumers or banks are instantiated. Since each consumer has attributes drawn
from the same random distributions, all consumers are expected to have the same
values for these attributes. Thus subscripts indicating individual expectations will
be removed (e.g. Yi = Yj = Y* for all i and j).
Stationarity in this model is defined as keeping the system wide expected
levels of short term assets and long term assets (and therefore total assets) for the
consumers and banks constant over time. If stationarity is imposed at the system
wide expected levels of assets, it follows that the same must be true for individual
consumers and the bank.
Stationarity is important because it eliminates any effects of growth and
allows the examination of critical points in meaningful ways. Without stationarity,
the inclusion of a growth trend would be necessary. This would significantly
complicate any expectations in the model. Without stationarity imposed, the system
would constantly be in flux. While this is in of itself is not problematic, the purpose
of the PBLM is to examine critical points and critical behaviors. If a system is
constantly in flux, the question of what is meaningful becomes less clear as a
baseline for stability no longer exists. It is possible that critical points may be
identified during a period of flux, but it is unclear if those points would still be
meaningful during other periods of flux or stability. Thus stationarity is important
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for not unnecessarily complicating the model and allowing decisive results to be
found.
True stationarity does not exist in the PBLM. Although consumers and banks
operate under the belief that there is stationarity, the system actually experiences a
decrease in wealth each period due to the negative expected value of a bank failure.
Solving this issue would require calculating the probability of a consumer losing all
of his or her money in a bank failure in a stationary system. This would be extremely
difficult once proximity based learning is accounted for since learning can lead to
consumers panicking and panic induces more panic.68 Further, calibrating the
system for stationarity incorporates the expected loss due to a bank failure which
must be calculated in a stationary system. This is a circular issue that prevents true
stationarity from being imposed.69 There is also the added complication of debt
forgiveness. If a consumer only has $100,000 but needs to pay off a debt of
$120,000, the remaining $20,000 is essentially written off.70 But this is not
accounted for in the standard expectations taken in the PBLM. Thus the expected
value of consumer actions should actually be greater since full losses are not able to
be absorbed by the system.
There are two opposing forces on stationarity that are not accounted for in
the PBLM. The expected loss due a bank failure makes the system tend negative
These ideas are elaborated on in the Proximity Based Learning Section. Readers
may want to read that section before coming back to the problems with stationarity
in this model.
69 “Revising is like pooping. You need to get it all out there first and then pick
through it for kernels of truth.” – Micah Lau (2012).
70 There is no true receiver of the deficits paid by consumers. The amounts
consumers pay out are simply assumed to leave the system.
68
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while debt forgiveness makes the system tend positive. It is absolutely not the
intention of this study to assume the two forces cancel each other out.71 Neither
issue could be resolved at this time. Hence all results from this project should be
taken with the caveat that the assumption that assets are stationary may or may not
be true.72 The stationarity excluding the possibility of a bank failure and debt
forgiveness is as close to true stationarity as this study could come.73,74

Individual Consumer75
Applied to the individual consumer, stationarity means the consumer’s
expected total assets do not change over time. 76 Since before instantiation all
consumers are expected to have the same attributes, the subscript indicating the
Although this would be extremely convenient.
The problems created by the lack of stationarity will be discussed in the section
on proximity based learning.
73 The author expects this issue to be a tree with depth equal to the number of
consumers in the model. At each node, a consumer learns. Each branch stemming
from the node indicates the various “combinations” of consumers the consumer
might see. But these combinations are dependent on the states of each of those
consumers. For example, Consumer A might have been shocked, might have not had
the opportunity to learn, might have panicked, might not have panicked, etc. The
order in which the consumers learn also matters so that would further multiply the
already immense number of branches from each node. Taking expectations would
also be made even more difficult by the fact that the panic process is so affected by
heterogeneity that to use consistent expectations would rob the model of the
learning process that makes it so unique.
74 The issue of stationarity in the DD model is not relevant. In the DD, there is just
one cycle after which all agents and assets disappear. The lack of continuity means
agents are unconcerned with the future. However, if there was growth over time,
any future tipping points should account for that growth.
75 Let β = β and α = α .
c
c
76 The expected levels are constant at the same points in the period across periods.
I.e. a consumer’s expected level of short term assets after receiving her net income is
St + It for all t. However, the consumer’s expected level of short term assets before
receiving her net income is St for all t. Timing is very important here.
71
72
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specific consumer will be dropped. Let the consumer’s expected current total level
of assets before she receives her net income in period t be represented by Kt.
Stationarity implies
24.

Kt = Ks = K* for all periods s and t where K* is the total value of the
consumer’s initial endowments of resources

77

Stationarity is also defined here to mean that the consumer’s expected levels of
short term and long term assets are constant. Let the consumer’s expected face
value amounts of short term and long term assets in period t before she receives her
net income be St and Lt, respectively. Stationarity implies
25.

St = Ss = S* for all periods s and t

26.

Lt = Ls = L* for all periods s and t

where S* and L* are the initial endowments of short term and long term assets for all
consumers.
Consider the actions the consumer undertakes in each period. She initially
receives her net income which has an expected value I*. Since consumer assets grow
over time at positive rates βc and αc, I* must be negative to keep the expected total
value of assets constant over time. Using equation 5, this means
I* = E[I] = Y*(1 – γ* – λΨ) < 0 which implies
27.

1 – γ* – λΨ < 0

In the section on net income, γ*, λ, and Ψ are all at least 0 since they are the
consumer’s expected average consumption rate, probability of getting shocked, and
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Initial resource endowments are identical for all consumers.

41
the income multiplier of the shock. Equation 27 yields a relationship indicating the
necessary magnitudes of these variables.
Following the principles outlined in the Asset Liquidation section, consumers
liquidate all short term assets before any long term assets due to the real cost
associated with early liquidation. Thus the consumer expects to pay a deficit of |I*|
each period.
Suppose |I*| ≥ S*. Then she is expected to exhaust her entire supply of short
term assets each period. This is unsustainable as this means she is expected to have
0 long term assets in the next period following the asset conversion guidelines. This
is impossible under the definition of stationarity unless her initial long term asset
endowment is 0. We will ignore this case as it would be trivial. Therefore we assume
28.

|I*| < S*

After the consumer pays off her deficit, she has S*+ I* in short term assets and
L*. Following the asset conversion process, this means in period t+1 before she
receives her net income she will have S*+ I* in long term assets and β(L*) in short
term assets. Since we have been using expected values this entire time, according to
stationarity of short term assets, equation 25 means
S* = β(L*)
29.

!∗

L* = !

Equation 29 indicates the balance between the initial face value of the short term
asset endowment and initial face value of the long term asset endowment for all
consumers under the assumption of stationarity. This is a key calibrating
relationship in the PBLM.
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According to the stationarity of long term assets, equation 26 means
S*+ I* = L*
!∗

S* + I * = !
30.

substituting equation 29 into this yields
which simplifies to

!∗

β = !∗ ! ! ∗

Equation 30 indicates that the long term return rate for consumers is a function of
the consumer’s initial short term endowment and expected net income. This is
another key calibrating relationship in the PBLM.
Together, equations 27, 28, 29, and 30 provide several key relationships
required to keep consumer assets stationary in the PBLM.

Bank
Nearly all of the steps for finding the relationship that keeps the bank assets
stationary parallel that for the consumer assets. Banks are endowed with no assets
of their own. Hence their starting endowments of short term and long term assets
are equal to those of the consumer. Banks are also subject to the same change in
assets due to the net incomes of consumers that consumers are. Thus if all of the
bank’s “equations” are divided by the initial number of consumers, the steps for
finding stationarity are nearly identical. However, banks also face the
aforementioned operating cost D.78 Let the operating cost per consumer by d.79 Note
that changes in bank assets due to returns on investments are in terms of the
underlying asset returns, not the consumer asset returns.80
This cost is only incurred after the initial period and its timing is crucial.
Assume d < 0.
80 i.e. banks’ long term assets are converted into short term assets at β not β , etc.
b
c
78
79
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Consider the bank’s expected asset levels per consumer in period 0. Initially,
before consumers make any withdrawals, the bank holds S* in short term assets and
!∗
!!

in long term assets. Notice that the ratio of short to long term assets is in terms of

βc not βb. Once consumers make their expected withdrawals each of I*, the bank has
!∗

S*+ I* in short term assets and ! in long term assets. Following the asset conversion
!

process, in period 1 the bank is expected to have per capita short term holdings of
!∗
!!

(𝛽! ) and long term holdings of S*+ I*. Immediately after the asset conversion
!∗

process, the operating cost is imposed on the bank. We will assume |d| < ! (𝛽! ) such
!

!∗

that the bank now holds ! 𝛽! + 𝑑 > 0 in short term assets.
!

Since we are still using expectations, under the definition of the stationarity
of bank assets, we have
!∗

S* = ! 𝛽! + d which can be rewritten as
!

31.

𝛽! = (1 −

!
!∗

)𝛽!

81

Equation 31 indicates that the long run return on the bank asset must be sufficiently
large to offset the operating cost imposed on banks. Note that equation 30 equates
the expectations of the bank’s long term assets in the same way that it does so for
consumers. Thus equation 31 in conjunction with the previously mentioned
calibrating relationships for consumers create stationarity among bank assets.82

Since d < 0, βb > βc which is consistent with equation 11 in the section on the
consumer asset.
82 The reader may find these calibrating relationships interesting since neither α
c
nor αb are anywhere to be found. How is it possible that α is irrelevant in
81
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Proximity Based Learning
Proximity based learning is at the core of how the PBLM expands upon the
DD model. Proximity based learning means a consumer is able to look at the wealth
distributions of several near consumers and use that information to make a
decision. This allows the actions of one consumer to affect the decisions of any other
consumers that observe his or her actions. This mechanism will be used to transmit
panic between consumers so that the panic process can actually be modeled. A panic
here is a decision by a consumer to withdraw all their assets from the bank
immediately even though he or she may not have an immediate liquidity need. This
means liquidating short term assets at face value and long term assets at αc times
face value and holding cash instead.
Proximity based learning is the process by which a consumer can observe
others consumers, see the consumers’ net incomes or any additional withdrawal the
consumers chose to make, and whether or not the consumers panicked in the
current period. 83 For example, Consumer A might observe Consumer B. Consumer A

determining stationarity in the system? The PBLM is only stationary excluding the
expected loss due to a bank failure. It is only when consumers panic and banks fail
that any agent would choose to liquidate their assets early and actually receive a
return of α. Since consumers and banks do not actively expect losses due to a bank
failure, α is not considered in any calibrating equations that are necessary for
“stationarity.” However, true stationarity would almost surely include both αc and αb
as those are expected to affect how likely the bank is to fail.
83 Once a consumer has the opportunity to do proximity based learning, the
consumer may choose to withdraw his or her entire remaining assets from the bank
and instead hold that amount as cash. Hence a consumer that may have had positive
net income of $400 but later panicked and withdrew $3000 from the bank would be
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could see that Consumer B is holding $300 in cash and has not yet panicked in the
period. If Consumer B executes his proximity based learning later84 and then
decides to panic and withdraw his remaining $2000 from the bank, Consumer A is
unable to change her actions. Each consumer only learns once in each period and
they act upon the information they receive as soon as they receive it. Hence
consumers have no ability to receive updated information or change their decisions
once they have been made.85
In the DD model in period 1, if consumer liquidity demands (negative net
incomes) will be at such a level that the bank will fail, “everyone rushes in to
withdraw their deposits before the bank gives out all of its assets.”86 In the sentence
above, “if consumer withdrawals will be” is indicative of the fact that every
consumer is able to see the liquidity demands of every other consumer before
consumers actually act upon any desires to liquidate assets from the bank. The
intuition behind proximity based learning is that such extensive consumer
information is not actually readily available to everyone. It seems unrealistic that
each consumer should be aware of every other account holder at the bank. It is more
reasonable to expect that Consumer A may be aware of the liquidity needs of several
of her friends. Based off of this limited information, Consumer A develops beliefs
regarding the greater consumer population to make a decision.
seen as withdrawing $3000 in cash after his turn to withdraw, but depositing $400
before.
84 The order in which consumers perform proximity based learning is random.
85 This is consistent with the idea of the single service constraint. Diamond and
Dybvig expand on this and say “a bank’s payoff to any agent can depend only on the
agent’s place in line and not on future information about agents behind him in line.”
86 DD (1983) p.403.
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The bank panic process in the DD model is simultaneous and realized by all
consumers. This is logical in the presence of complete knowledge of consumer
actions and the bank’s assets. However, using the proximity based learning process,
this study allows decisions of consumers to affect the decisions of other consumers.
The PBLM lets the authors include an actual panic transmission process where if
Consumer A observes Consumer B panic, Consumer A is more likely to panic
because she saw Consumer B panic. This panic transmission process can lead to a
“coordinated panic” like in the DD model, but this is the organic result of consumers
passing on information as opposed to a byproduct of completely visible consumer
and bank information.
The information a consumer receives from this process is dependent on
whom the consumer observes and when the consumer observes them. Whom the
consumer observes is based on actual geographical proximity and chance. In this
model, each consumer looks at their neighborhood (think of a square at which the
consumer is in the middle) and randomly picks G consumers in that neighborhood
to look at.87 Although geographical proximity is used here, it could be thought of as
social familiarity. Geographical proximity is convenient in that it allows information
to spread with a literal domino effect. When refers to the timing of the observation.
This important idea merits its own subsection below.

G is the maximum number of consumers one can observe. If there are fewer than
G consumers in one’s neighborhood, the consumer looks at all consumers in the
neighborhood.

87
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Timing
Timing here will generally refer to the consumer’s place in line to do
proximity based learning.88 Timing is very important in the learning process
because consumers must make their decision immediately after they learn and are
then unable to take any other actions. This was highlighted in the example above
where once Consumer A chose not to panic, she could not later withdraw any money
from the bank in the period. Consumer A may observe Consumer B before or after
Consumer B has the opportunity to learn. If Consumer B has not already learned,
then Consumer B has not had the opportunity to withdraw all his money from the
bank. Also, Consumer A does not have the opportunity to benefit from “informed”
actions of Consumer B.
The above paragraph is also indicative of the fact that the liquidity demands
on the system are dynamic. If Consumer A chooses to panic, she will withdraw all of
her assets from the bank. Her panic and withdrawal increase the liquidity demand
in the system. Thus Consumer A is able to impose a state change on the system
when she learns. Liquidity demands can never drop below their initial level as the
initial level reflects the net incomes of consumers in the system. Consumers can
always panic and withdraw more money from the bank beyond their net income,
but they can never choose to deposit more money into the bank beyond their net
income.89,90 Since consumers panicking can increase liquidity demands on the

88I.e.

the first consumer to learn goes “before” or “earlier” than the last consumer in
line to learn.
89 This comes from the fact that consumers have no other external sources of money
they could deposit.
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system, as more consumers have the opportunity to learn, it becomes more likely
that at least one of them will panic and increase the overall liquidity demand. Thus
one would expect for the final (after everyone has learned) liquidity demands on the
system to be larger than the initial demands.
Given that consumers are unable to revise any past decisions or make
decisions based on future information from consumers, they can only attempt to
assess the current state of the system when it is their turn to learn. The first
consumer in line will see the system in its true initial state whereas the 50th person
could see the system after up to 49 state changes. However, when the two
consumers learn, they are actually seeing different environments due to the timing.
Thus they are making decisions based off of the environment that exists around
them when they make their decision. Although the system the 50th consumer sees is
more likely to be closer to the system’s final state, his actions are not necessarily
more correct than the one’s the first consumer undertakes. Each consumer must be
judged against the environment they are in when they have the opportunity to make
a decision. This idea will become clearer in the results section when the accuracy of
consumer estimates is evaluated.91 It would be unfair to evaluate the correctness of
the first consumer’s actions against the final system state when that was not the

Technically if a consumer panicked and withdrew all their money from the bank
in the previous period, they would have more money than just their net income.
However, the extra money beyond the true net income would be treated as net
income in the accounting of the system.
91 This study will look at the consumer’s estimate of their current environment
compared to the actual state of the environment at that time to determine
“correctness.”
90
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state the first consumer acted in. Timing allows us look at whether the consumer is
making a good decision at that point in time.

Proximity Based Learning Tipping Point
Consumers use the liquidity information they obtain from the proximity
based learning process to gauge overall liquidity demands on the bank. If they feel
liquidity demands are larger than the bank can meet, they panic. The balance
between liquidity demands and the bank’s assets will now be discussed.92
Banks in the PBLM are always net negative. Consumers initially deposit short
term assets which the bank offers back to them at face value. The long term assets
consumers initially deposit are redeemable to the consumer at αc times face value
but the bank can only liquidate long term assets at αb times face value and αb < αc.
Hence the bank’s liabilities are greater than its assets. Under the stationarity
assumptions, expected consumer assets (or the bank’s liabilities) are constant and
expected bank assets are constant so the bank is always expected to have a negative
net worth. This is actually not problematic. In period 1 of the DD model, the bank is
also net negative. In fact, any liquidity services provided by the bank at all
necessitates that the bank be net negative at least sometimes and exposed to bank
runs.93
Similar to the DD model, the bank can be net negative and consumers are not
necessarily worried. Consumers need only be worried when other consumers
92
93

Banks use their short term and long term assets to meet obligations.
DD (1983) p.403.
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withdraw so much money from the bank that the bank will run out of assets to meet
its expected obligations in the next period.94 Thus the bank can exist in a net
negative state as long as consumers believe the bank can meet its expected
obligations. What follows will build off of ideas of the DD and PBLM equilibria
discussed in the Diamond and Dybvig Equlibria section.
We will now consider the bank’s per capita level of assets. In the first period,
the bank has S* in short term assets and L in long term assets. The consumer has
expected net income I < 0 and the bank’s operating cost per consumer is d < 0.
Suppose the consumer’s actual net income in the period is
32.

I1 = -(S* + 𝛼! (

!! ! !!!!
!!

)) < 0
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Then the consumer withdraws –I1 from the bank.96 The bank must now generate –I1
in value by liquidating its short and long term assets. Following the liquidation rules,
the bank initially attempts to liquidate –I1 using it short term assets. However, since
33.

I1> S*

The bank liquidates all of its short term assets but must still service the remaining
𝛼! (

!! ! !!!!
!!

). Since the bank liquidates its long term assets at a rate of αb times face

value, it must liquidate (

!! ! !!!!
!!

) in face value of long term assets to fully meet the

obligation. The bank is able to do so since d, I < 0 and =< 𝐿. Thus the bank will have

If the bank is unable to meet its expected obligations in the current period, it
surely cannot meet obligations in the next period.
95 Assume 𝛽 𝐿 + 𝑑 + 𝐼 > 0
!
96 Assume that the consumer has the assets to make such a withdrawal.
94
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L-(

!! ! !!!!
!!

) in face value long term assets and no short term assets at the end of

the period.
Following the asset conversion process into the next period, the bank’s long
term assets are converted into short term assets at a rate of βb times face value.
Thus the bank will now have
34.

βb(L - (

!! ! !!!!
!!

)) = βb(L) - βb(L) – d – I = -d – I

𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = −𝑑 − 𝐼
in short term assets and no long term assets. The bank must now pay its per capita
operating cost of d. It attempts to do that out of its short term assets first so it will
have –d – I + d = -I in short term assets remaining. Now the consumer will receive
her net income which has an expected value of I. If the consumer’s net income I2 was
actually more negative than expected (i.e. I2 < I), then the bank would not be able to
meet the consumer’s full withdrawal. If the bank is not able to meet the consumer’s
full withdrawal, the bank fails and the consumer loses the difference.
Thus the consumer’s initial withdrawal I1 was just large enough that the bank
has exactly the amount it needed to meet its expected obligations in the next period.
Had the consumer withdrawn any more money, the bank would be expected to fail
in the next period. So equation 32 captures the tipping point for the average
withdrawal per consumer relative to the average short term and long term holdings
of the bank per consumer before the bank is expected to fail.
This tipping point will now be placed in the context of the whole system.
Essentially, if total withdrawals are so high that they decrease the bank’s assets in
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the next period below the bank’s expected obligations in the next period, the bank is
expected to fail in the next period. Hence any consumer realizing the bank is beyond
this tipping point will panic and attempt to withdraw all their assets from the bank
in the current period to avoid losing all their assets in the bank failure in the next
period. This is the tipping point reached when the sequential service constraint and
other ideas from the Diamond Dybvig Equilibria section are fully applied to the
PBLM.
There are two panic conditions in this model that are evaluated against this
tipping point. First, consumers will panic if they feel other consumers are
withdrawing such a large amount from the bank that the bank will not be able to
meet its expected obligations in the next period. This is considered a liquidity panic.
Second, consumers will also panic if the proportion of panicked consumers they
observe is so large that they think the bank will not be able to meet its expected
obligations in the next period. This is considered a panic panic. Both of these
conditions are evaluated using ad hoc expectations.

First Condition
Under this condition, Consumer A is worried that other consumers are
withdrawing so much money from the bank that the bank will not be able to meet its
expected obligations in the next period. This section describes equation 32
evaluated using the idea of proximity based learning. Let ζ ** be the actual average
withdrawal amount of every consumer in the system at the time Consumer A is
learning. Let π** be the actual average amount of short term assets the bank holds
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per consumer at the time A is learning. Let ξ** be the actual average amount of long
term assets the bank holds per consumer at the time A is learning. To gauge the
overall liquidity demands of the system, Consumer A looks at either the cash
holdings of his neighbors or their initial liquidity demands.97 Consumer A uses this
information to estimate the average withdrawal ζ *** of every other consumer this
period.
35.

ζ *** =

! !"#! !" !"#$#%! !"#$"%"&' !"#$%!
!"#$%& !" !"#$%&'($

𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 ! 𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
36.

E[ζ ***] = ζ **

Consumer A then estimates how much the bank holds in short term assets
using his own short term assets as the average amount of short term assets held by
every other consumer in the system. Consumer A uses the same method to estimate
the average amount of long term assets held by every other consumer. So if the
consumer holds JA in short term assets and JL in long term assets, he estimates the
average short term assets π*** and long term assets ξ*** such that
37.

π *** = JA

38.

ξ *** = JL

Consumer A then compares the estimated withdrawals to the estimated bank
assets the bank holds according to equation 32. If the estimated withdrawals are
large enough such that the bank’s expected assets in the future cannot meet its

If a consumer is shocked or panics, they will hold those assets as cash. However, a
consumer that is not shocked or has not panicked would have deposited net income
into the bank. Thus cash holdings increase the average withdrawal amount whereas
the initial liquidity demand decreases if the consumer holds no cash.

97
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expected obligations, Consumer A will panic and withdraw all her money from the
bank.
This condition focuses on Consumer A’s perception of pure liquidity strains based
on estimations of the bank’s short term assets according to equation 32.
Consumer A does not have true rational expectations of consumer
withdrawals or the bank’s assets. Consumers could have perfect rational
expectations given that all variables in the model come from known distributions
and all parameters are known. However, calculating these rational expectations
would be extremely difficult and not a realistic behavior in practice.98 Instead
Consumer A uses ad-hoc expectations based on the information available to him
when he makes his decision. These ad-hoc expectations are not entirely rational as
they are instead based on actual information available to the consumer. Consumer A
forms beliefs regarding the state of the system based on the information learned and
acts accordingly. The use of ad-hoc expectations is deemed to be more appropriate
for the PBLM as it attempts to remove ideas like complete visibility into consumer
actions and see how panics can develop with limited information. The “estimations”
used here are reflective of the decisions that are based on ad-hoc expectations as
opposed to perfect rational expectations.

Lovell(1986) reviewed a number of empirical studies looking at the validity of
rational expectations. He found that although a number of the models were based on
sound micro foundations, empirical evidence suggested that the rational
expectations hypothesis should be rejected.

98
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Second Condition
Under this condition, Consumer A is worried that such a large proportion of
consumers are panicking that the bank will not be able to meet its expected
obligations in the next period. To gauge this, Consumer A looks at his neighbors and
observes what proportion of them have panicked. Let the observed proportion be
θ*** such that
39.

!"#$%& !" !"#$%&$' !"#$%&

θ*** = !"#$%& !" !"#$%&'($ !"#$%&$'

Consumer A uses this information to estimate θ*** of all consumers will panic this
period. Consumer A then estimates how much each panicking consumer will
withdraw, Ω, from the bank using his own levels of short term assets, Jshort, and long
term assets, Jlong.99 Thus following the rules for asset liquidations,
40.

Ω = Jshort + αc(Jlong)

So the expected withdrawal unconditional whether the consumer panicked is θ***
times Ω.
Consumer A then estimates how much the bank holds in short term assets
using his own short term assets as the average amount of short term assets held by
every other consumer in the system and the same for his long term assets. So if the
consumer holds JA in short term assets and JL in long term assets, he estimates the
average short term assets π*** and long term assets ξ*** such that
41.

π *** = JA

42.

ξ *** = JL

Alternatively, Consumer A could look at the average cash holdings of each
panicked consumer to determine Ω.

99
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Consumer A then compares his estimated average “panic withdrawals,” θ***
(Ω), to his estimation of the bank’s assets, ξ *** and π ***. This comparison is made
using the tipping point equation 32.
This condition focuses on Consumer A’s perceived liquidity strains based on
estimations of the bank’s assets caused by individuals panicking. The economic
intuition and use of ad-hoc expectations here is similar to that for the first condition
which focused purely on liquidity strains. Although this condition ultimately comes
down to perceived liquidity strains too, the perceived strains stem from the
proportion of people panicking.
Under condition 2, the reader can see how a consumer panicking directly
induces other consumers to panic. This captures the transmission of panics directly.
It makes sense to have a panic condition where panic creates itself. Imagine
someone screaming as they witness a murder in the subway. Other passersby do not
need to personally witness the murder to feel frightened so long as they receive
strong enough signals from their neighbors.

Panic Creates More Panic
The way the two conditions are set up, Consumer A panicking makes other
consumers more likely to panic in two ways. When Consumer A panics, she
withdraws all of her assets from the bank. This increases the amount of cash she
holds. Since cash holdings are what consumers use to gauge the liquidity strains
other consumers are putting on the bank, this makes other consumers more likely to
panic under the first condition. Thus panic directly leads to more panic in the first
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condition. The second condition describes how Consumer A’s panic directly
increases the estimated average panic withdrawals which increases the likelihood of
other consumers panicking.
It is interesting to note that the second condition cannot occur until the first
condition occurs. The second condition looks at whether or not Consumer A should
panic based on the panic behavior of her neighbors. If there are no panics, there can
be no panic panic. However, high levels of normal withdrawals could cause
Consumer A to panic under the first condition regardless of anybody else’s panic
behavior. This has the interesting effect where consumers that learn early in the
process may be more likely to panic under the more measured first condition
whereas once panics occur, the likelihood of panicking due to the second condition
increases. Either way, since panic leads to more panic, consumers that learn later
are expected to be more likely to panic than early consumers. Ironically, the
consumers that learn last are the ones most likely to lose all their money in a bank
failure and the ones most likely to panic.

Distortion Potential In Estimating Bank Assets
Consumers only look at their own levels of short and long term assets to
estimate the bank’s assets. This can be problematic if a consumer is shocked. When
the consumer is shocked, he or she must withdraw a significant portion of their
assets in order to pay off the deficit. Thus the consumer would have a very low
estimate of the bank’s assets. Getting shocked greatly distorts one’s estimation of
the bank’s asset and therefore increases one’s likelihood of panicking. This is not an
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unreasonable result especially if one considers the shock to be a period of high
stress and humans tend to perform poorly under stress. Further, if systemic shocks
are incorporated either directly into the PBLM or into consumer behavior, such a
distortion may be desirable. As the PBLM currently stands, this estimation process
is prone to distortions. More research and expansion of the model need to be
conducted to determine whether or not this should be the case.
A possible alternative would be to allow consumers to expand the
information they receive through learning to include the asset levels of other
consumers. Essentially, consumers currently estimate bank assets using a sample
size of 1 (their own assets). Expanding that sample size through proximity based
learning would likely have a similar effect to that of group size on the asset
estimation differential. However, this would mean consumers are now essentially
sharing their exact levels of personal wealth their neighbors. This seems to be a
stretch in terms of what information should be available to consumers.
Nevertheless, this approach is one that should be explored in the future. Another
interesting alternative would be implementing a weighted average of a consumer’s
past asset levels such that the impact of a shock could be smoothed. This could have
the same impact of increasing the sample size but still keeping consumers
constrained by the knowledge of only their own asset levels. Other alternatives
should at least be considered due to the potential for shock distortion in the current
estimation process.
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Stationarity Problem
Stationarity is a problem in the PBLM because growth is not explicitly
accounted for in the panic conditions. While the bank’s assets and consumer assets
likely both grow in the same direction, it is very possible they grow at different
magnitudes. This is problematic because consumers believe they constitute a per
capita share of the bank’s assets.100 If growth rates cause each consumer to no
longer hold a per capita share of the bank’s assets, the consumer cannot easily
estimate the bank’s assets. Since the decision to panic ultimately comes down to the
whether the consumer’s estimated bank assets are large enough to sustain
estimated liquidity demands and expected obligations in the next period, any errors
in the consumer’s estimate of the bank’s assets affect the decision to panic. Any
growth in assets should be accounted for so that the consumer can make a panic
decision based on an accurate baseline relationship between the bank’s assets and
consumes’ assets.
An alternative approach could have been taken where the PBLM looks at just
one cycle like the DD model. In that case, the PBLM would still be an interesting
extension of the DD model as the PBLM could follow the same rules but incorporate
learning as a panic transmission process. Stationarity would not be an issue with
just one cycle as there would be no reason to consider future growth. In a one cycle
model under the DD rules, during the learning process, type 1 consumers would
liquidate their entire endowment of assets (which would be constant across all
Per capita share is used to indicate that if there are 80 consumers in the system,
the expected assets of a consumer should be equal to 1/80 of the bank’s actual
assets.

100
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consumers). Type 2 consumers would look at the proportion of type 1 consumers
around them during the learning process and attempt to estimate the true
proportion of type 1 consumers in the system. As discussed in the Diamond and
Dybvig Equilibria section, this proportion of type 1 consumers would be the basis
for whether or not a panic occurs under given banking contracts. Thus panic
transmissions could be observed in meaningful ways by incorporating proximity
based learning into the DD framework. Unfortunately, the problem with stationarity
was realized too late in the process to make the change to a single cycle model. As it
stands, the current PBLM lays the foundation for a future model with true risk
aversion and optimization that is able to incorporate multiple cycles.

Unnecessary Panics
Due to the fact that consumers receive limited information that may or may
not be representative of the actual state of the system, there exist “unnecessary
panics.” These are panics that occur due to incorrect beliefs consumers develop
through the learning process. For example, had the consumer been fully aware of all
consumers’ liquidity needs and the bank assets, the consumer would not panic.
However, the consumer might observe a group of consumers with particularly high
liquidity demands which cause the consumer to overestimate the actual liquidity
demands and unnecessarily panic. But as more consumers begin to panic and
increase the liquidity demands on the bank, it is possible that a bank that should not
have failed due to initial liquidity demands could end up failing as demands become
too large when more consumers learn and panic.
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If there were complete awareness of information on all consumers and the
bank, any time the bank is in a failure position, each consumer would know. This is
the case in the DD model. Thus any panic (caused by large initial liquidity demands)
under the DD model would always happen in the PBLM as there is no way to avoid
the initial liquidity strains on the bank.101 But the learning process allows for a bank
failure to develop before this point given that consumers may incorrectly panic and
consequently cause an actual large scale panic and failure situation. The learning
process can be thought of as a replacement for the sunspots that may cause bank
failures.102

Proximity Based Learning Summary
The idea of proximity based learning stems from the fact that consumers
want to make informed decisions. However, the PBLM generally assumes that
consumers do not have access to all the information they could use (i.e. overall
liquidity demands, panic proportions, and the bank’s levels of assets). Through the
learning process, consumers are able to derive some of this information from small
samples. Consumers may sample a group of 10 consumers to identify their average
liquidity demands. The consumer then assumes that that sample was representative
and that that average is a good estimate for the overall liquidity demands in the
system. This of course exposes consumers to drawing incorrect conclusions due to

Note that equation 15 which captures the “DD” tipping point if it were translated
into the PBLM is not the same as equation 32 which is the PBLM tipping point. But
they are the same in spirit.
102 DD (1983) p.410.
101
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non-representative samples. But this is more and better information than solely
using one’s own information.
The presence of this learning is very different than the simultaneous and
complete distribution of information in the DD model. In the DD model, as soon as
any proportion of consumers would attempt to withdraw any amount of assets from
the bank such that the bank would fail, all consumers are instantly aware of this fact
so they all try to withdraw their entire assets from the bank before it fails. An
example of this is given in the section on Diamond-Dybvig equilibria. All consumers
essentially have access to information on all other consumers and the bank, hence
no one is caught unaware should a bank run occur. Bank runs or bank panics and
bank failures are synonymous in the DD model.
Consumers in the PBLM have localized information as opposed to full
information. But consumers can pass information to each other via the learning
process. Thus the learning process in the PBLM allows for the transmission of panics
to be modeled. As discussed earlier in the section, one consumer panicking makes
each consumer that has yet to learn more likely to panic. This is effectively
communicating panic from one consumer to others. With this process, readers can
directly see how individuals panicking can cascade into herd like behavior and
eventually cause a bank failure. However, the cascading effect is not simultaneous
like it is in the DD model. The proximity based learning process allows information
to disseminate through the population in a social network fashion.
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Results
Place In Line (Timing)
Please first read the subsection on Timing in the Proximity Based Learning
Section. A consumer’s place in line indicates when they are able to learn.
Results were obtained using the following scenario in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Parameters for Place In Line
Consumer Shock Probability
Consumer Short Term
Endowment
Consumer Long Term
Endowment
Consumer Gross Income
Consumer Net Income
Consumer Short Term Payout
Consumer Long Term Payout
Consumer Mean Rate of
Consumption
Consumer Shock Multiplier
Consumer Population
All Consumers Visible
Bank Long Term Asset Return
Bank Short Term Asset Return
Bank Count
Bank Operating Cost
Consumer Group Size
Bank Assets Not Visible

0.5
100000
57500
50000
-42500
1.18876
1.73913
0.85
2
100
FALSE
1.826087
1
1
500000
10
TRUE

The scenario was executed 200 times using Repast Simphony with Java.103

The scenario was only executed 200 times due to issues with the simulation
software.

103
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As discussed in the Timing subsection in the Proximity Based Learning
Section, the state of the system is dynamic with respect to consumers’ ability to
learn and panic. Consumers can only panic when they learn, not before or after.
Further, the way panic conditions are structured in the PBLM, panic is expected to
lead to more panic under both the liquidity panic condition and panic panic
condition. From a system wide standpoint, when the first consumer learns, no
consumers will have had the opportunity to panic. Hence there can be at most 0
panicked consumers out of the entire population before he learns. When the last
consumer learns, every other consumer has had the opportunity to panic. Thus
assuming the probability of panicking is nonzero, the proportion of panics (total
number of panicked consumers divided by consumer population size) is expected to
be larger later in the system than it is earlier. Since panic is expected to increase the
likelihood of others panicking, this should translate into consumers that learn last
are more likely to panic than consumers that learn first. Essentially, the later a
consumer learns, the greater probability of the consumer panicking. Data regarding
the proportion of periods each consumer panicked by place in line is shown below.
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Figure 2: Proportion of Panics vs. Place In Line
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The above data reflect that the proportion of times a consumer panicked
(indicated by the blue diamond labeled “Panic”) does in fact increase as place in line
increases. Thus the data reflect that panic does create panic as expected from the
theoretical model. This result indicates that there is an effective panic transmission
process created by proximity based learning. Proximity based learning is a viable
method of understanding how bank failures can organically develop through panic
transmission as opposed to using levels of information that lead to completely
coordinated panics like the DD model uses.
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Data regarding the two different panic conditions is also displayed in the
graph. The probability of panicking regardless of condition is nearly identical to the
probability of panicking under the liquidity condition. This result was somewhat
surprising as the author had hypothesized the panic panic condition would become
more “effective” as the number of panics in the system increased. But it appears the
reaction to liquidity concerns is stronger than the reaction to panic based liquidity
concerns as the two panic conditions are defined in the PBLM. As a result, in the
following analysis the separation of the two panic conditions will be dropped and
we will only be interested in the proportion of any type of panic.
When consumers learn, the expectation is that the information they obtain
from a limited sample size is reflective of the overall state of the system. Thus the
proportion of panicked consumers each consumer sees when they learn should
approximate the actual proportion of panicked consumers in that system state.
These data are presented below according to the consumer’s place in line.
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Figure 3: Proportion of Panicked Consumers Observed vs. Place In Line
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These data clearly indicate the expected relationship between the
consumer’s place in line and the proportion of panicked consumers observed. Since
the latter is a proxy for the actual proportion of panicked consumers in the system,
we can see that consumers’ perceptions of the system change over time (referring to
place in line) in a way that matches the expected actual changes in the system state
(based on the results in Figure 2). Thus proximity based learning is an effective way
for consumers to perceive the state of the system even as the system changes. This
is an important result because it means information is disseminating through the
system in a manner much more organic than assuming all consumers are aware of
all pertinent information (consumer liquidity demands and bank assets) like the DD
model does. Further, this allows for the transmission of panics to be modeled as

68
opposed to only having a single bank run equilibrium where all consumers panic at
the same time.
The data collected regarding how consumer responses change as the system
changes indicates that proximity based learning is an effective method of panic
transmission. The PBLM provides a framework for observing how individual
responses of consumers to localized information can cascade into a bank failure.
This is a new addition to the literature that future researchers can use to actually
explore how panics might spread in more realistic situations when it may be
incorrect to assume information is so widely available that either all consumers
panic or none do like in the DD model.

Changing Magnitude of Net Income
As described in the stationarity section, the expected value of net income I is
negative. Increasing the magnitude of net income here refers to consumers
consuming a larger portion of their gross income in each period. Recall that
43.

I = E[I] = Y*(1 – γ* – λΨ) < 0 which implies

44.

1 – γ* – λΨ < 0

since Y*, γ*, λ, and Ψ are all at least 0 since they are respectively the consumer’s
expected gross income, expected average consumption rate, probability of getting
shocked, and the income multiplier of the shock. Increasing the magnitude of net
income was achieved by increasing the probability of consumers suffering an
idiosyncratic shock, λ.
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Results were obtained using the following scenarios in Table 2 below.
Parameters were kept as constant as possible under the stationarity conditions in
order to isolate the effect of changing the magnitude of net income. Consumer Long
!∗

Term Payout was calculated following βc = !∗ ! ! where S* was held constant at
$100,000 and I was changed from -$82500, -$62500, -$32500, and -$12500. Bank
Long Term Asset Return is equal to Consumer Long Term Payout multiplied by 1.05.
The ratio between the two long term returns is constant as is the short term
endowment such that the bank’s operating cost is constant in each scenario.
Table 4: Parameters for Changing Net Income Magnitude

Consumer Shock Probability
Consumer Short Term Endowment
Consumer Long Term Endowment
Consumer Gross Income
Consumer Short Term Payout
Consumer Long Term Payout
Consumer Mean Rate of
Consumption
Consumer Shock Multiplier
Consumer Population
Consumer Group Size
All Consumers Visible
Bank Assets Visible
Bank Long Term Asset Return
Bank Short Term Asset Return
Bank Count
Bank Operating Cost

Consumer Expected Net Income
-82500
-62500
-32500
-12500
0.9
0.7
0.4
0.2
100000
100000
100000
100000
17499.98688 37499.95313
67500.0675 88945.33953
50000
50000
50000
50000
1
1
1
1
5.71429
2.66667
1.48148
1.124286
0.85
2
100
25
FALSE
FALSE
6
1
1
500000

0.85
2
100
25
FALSE
FALSE
2.8
1
1
500000

0.85
2
100
25
FALSE
FALSE
1.55555
1
1
500000

0.85
2
100
25
FALSE
FALSE
1.2
1
1
500000
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Each scenario was executed 500 times using Repast Simphony with Java. The
results are shown below.104
Table 5: Proportion of Panics vs. Net Income
Proportion of Panics
Net Income
-$82500
Net Income
-$62500
Net Income
-$32500
Net Income
-$12500

0.366672901
0.332824339
0.187701131
0.041617774

Figure 6: Proportion of Panics vs. Net Income
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An alternative set of parameters was initially used, but it did not yield the
expected simulation results. This is due to the fact that the previous scenario did not
create much probability for a panic. Given that the sample size of 500 is relatively
small, the differences resulting from changing the magnitude of net income could
not be realized. A decision was made after the fact to use a more volatile scenario
that would clearly allow for significant differences even in a small sample size.
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Proportion of panics refers to the average proportion of consumers that
panicked for any reason in a period. The results clearly indicate that as the
magnitude of net income increases, the proportion of panics also increases. This
result is not surprising as the decision to panic is based on whether consumers
believe the bank will be able to meet its expected obligations in the next period.
Expected obligations are the bank’s operating cost and the expected withdrawals.
Thus as the magnitude of net income increases, the expected withdrawals increase.
Recall the tipping point equation 32 for the average withdrawal per customer.
45.

S* + 𝛼! (

!! ! !!!!
!!

)

Since I < 0, as the magnitude of net income increases, the average withdrawal such
that the bank will not be able to meet its expected obligations in the next period
decreases. Thus the tipping point average withdrawal becomes increasingly closer
to the expected withdrawal as the magnitude of net income rises. In a probabilistic
sense, the critical point moves closer to the mean of the distribution so the critical
point is more likely to occur. When the critical point occurs, consumers panic. The
results indicate the positive relationship between the magnitude of net income and
the proportion of panic expected from the underlying theoretical model.
Readers may also be interested in the probability of the bank actually failing
as the magnitude of net income rises. Those results are given below.
Table 7: Proportion of Bank Failures vs. Net Income
Net Income = -$82500
Net Income = -$62500
Net Income = -$32500
Net Income = -$12500

Proportion of Bank Failures
0.002588438
0
0
0
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Even with relatively high magnitudes of net income, the probability of a bank
failure is still quite small. The tipping point for the average withdrawal is still so
much greater than the expected withdrawal that a bank failure is extremely
unlikely. This is due in part to the fact that tipping point for the bank to actually fail
is based on the entire consumer population. In these simulations, that value was 100
consumers. However, when consumers made their personal panic decisions, they
were basing those decisions on observations of at most 25 consumers.105 Following
the Central Limit Theorem, it is unsurprising that individual consumers are more
likely to perceive a failure than the actual system is to experience one. Additionally,
while consumers’ bank asset estimations are subject distortions when consumers
are shocked, the bank’s actual assets are not affected nearly as significantly by
shocks.
The general results here stem from the fact that when the magnitude of net
income increases, the ability of the capital endowment to sustain any temporary
increases in consumption is diminished. This is evidenced by the analysis of the
tipping point in the section. Thus relatively low capital environments are more
vulnerable to bank failures than high capital environments.106 While this result is
not surprising, it indicates that low-capital environments could require benefit from
using greater oversight to create a more stable banking system. Avoiding these
additional regulations could be thought of as some of the benefits present in
Consumers look at the lesser of the number of consumers in neighborhood and
the learning group size.
106 Low and high here are indicative of the relationship between the magnitude of
net income and asset endowment.
105
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wealthier environments due to the fact that they already have large levels of capital.
This interpretation is consistent with Honohan (2000) who found that capital
requirements in industrial countries were not stringent enough for most developing
countries due to differences in economy size. He concluded that “strengthening the
hand of national bank regulators” in developing countries was the best way to
reduce the “fragility of [weaker] banking systems.”107

Changing αc (Consumer Alpha)
By holding αb constant (αb = 1) throughout all these simulations, we are able
to observe the effect of increasing the differential between αb and αc by simply
increasing αc.
Results were obtained using the following scenarios in Table 6 below.
Parameters were all kept constant under the stationarity conditions in order to
isolate the effect of changing αc.

107

Honohan (2000) pp32-33.
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Table 8: Parameters for Changing αc

αc = 1
Consumer Shock Probability
Consumer Short Term Endowment
Consumer Long Term Endowment
Consumer Gross Income
Consumer Net Income
Consumer Long Term Payout
Consumer Mean Rate of
Consumption
Consumer Shock Multiplier
Consumer Population
Consumer Group Size
All Consumers Visible
Bank Assets Visible
Bank Long Term Asset Return
Bank Short Term Asset Return
Bank Count
Bank Operating Cost

0.9
100000
17499.987
50000
-82500
5.71429
0.85
2
100
10
FALSE
FALSE
6
1
1
500000

Consumer Alpha
αc = 1.5
αc = 1.8
αc = 2.3
0.9
0.9
0.9
100000
100000
100000
17499.987 17499.987 17499.987
50000
50000
50000
-82500
-82500
-82500
5.71429
5.71429
5.71429
0.85
2
100
10
FALSE
FALSE
6
1
1
500000

0.85
2
100
10
FALSE
FALSE
6
1
1
500000

0.85
2
100
10
FALSE
FALSE
6
1
1
500000

Each scenario was executed 500 times using Repast Simphony with Java. The
results are shown below.108
Table 9: Proportion of Panics vs. αc
Alpha = 1
Alpha = 1.5
Alpha = 1.8
Alpha = 2.3805

Proportion of Panics
0.397224858
0.688365764
0.900157704
0.940229312

Figure 10: Proportion of Panics vs. αc
An alternative set of parameters was initially used, but it did not yield the
expected simulation results. This is due to the fact that the previous scenario did not
create much probability for a panic. Given that the sample size of 500 is relatively
small, the differences resulting from changing the magnitude of net income could
not be realized. A decision was made after the fact to use a more volatile scenario
that would clearly allow for significant differences even in a small sample size.
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Proportion of Panics vs. Alpha
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The results clearly indicate that as αc increases, the proportion of panics also
increases.109 This result is not surprising because αc is the rate at which consumers
can redeem their long term assets. Increasing αc directly increases the total value of
consumer assets held at the bank to consumers. The actual value of consumer assets
to the bank is unaffected by αc since the bank liquidates long term assets at αb which
will be left unchanged in these scenarios.
Thus as αc increases, the amount consumers can withdraw when they panic
increases. This means when consumers panic, they now place add a greater liquidity
demand to the overall system with a higher αc than they would have with a lower αc.
Interestingly, this effect does not occur until consumers start to panic as αc is
actually inconsequential to the liquidity panic condition. Since one liquidity panic
must occur before αc becomes relevant to the system, increasing αc does not
It is expected that the two have a logarithmic relationship which has an
asymptotic limit of 1 because the proportion of panics cannot exceed 1.

109
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increase the probability of the first panic starting. However, due to the increased
panic withdrawal, increasing αc increases the likelihood of every panic after the first.
Increasing αc makes the panic transmission process stronger.
The cost of a consumer liquidating his long term assets is βc - αc. Thus as αc
rises, the cost of early liquidation decreases so consumers are expected be more
willing to panic and liquidate early. This behavior is not explicitly included in the
PBLM as doing so would require true risk-aversion and optimization. However, this
behavior is intuitive and supported by the literature so it is to the benefit of this
study that its results also reflect this idea. In the DD model, expected returns in
period 2 are directly compared to αc. In Equation 13 it is clear that increasing αc in
the DD leads to greater liquidity demands on the bank and therefore a greater
probability of a bank failure. As a natural extension to the DD model, it makes sense
that this relationship should hold in the PBLM.
Consistent with the above analysis is the idea that the probability of the bank
failing should increase as αc increases. The data reflected this expected relationship.
These results are given below. Note that in the case where αc = 2.3805, the
proportion of bank failures actually exceeded the proportion of panics. This result is
not entirely surprising given that under proximity based learning, consumers may
not realize they are in a bank failure situation based on the information they
perceive.
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Table 11: Proportion of Bank Failures vs. αc
Alpha = 1
Alpha = 1.5
Alpha = 1.8
Alpha = 2.3805

Proportion of Bank Failures
0.003611673
0.320541761
0.825581395
0.998005982

Figure 10: Proportion of Bank Failures vs. αc
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The difference between αc and αb is a measure of the additional liquidity a
bank provides to consumers. As the bank provides more liquidity (i.e. a higher αc
ceteris paribus), the probability for a bank failure increases. The simulation results
support this conclusion both in the perceptions of the consumers (proportion of
panics) and in system response (proportion of bank failures). This relationship is
discussed multiple times in the original DD paper as something about which banks
and consumers should be concerned as there is a real loss when the bank fails. Other
studies such as Goldstein and Pauzner also find a positive relationship between the
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differential of αc and αb and the probability of the bank failing. Thus these
simulation results reinforce this finding with the added flavor of proximity based
learning as a panic transmission mechanism.

Changing Group Size
Group size is the number of neighbors a consumer can look at during their
proximity based learning phase. This section looks at the impact of changing the
group size on the system.
Results were obtained using the following scenarios in Table 10 below. All
other parameters were all kept constant under the stationarity conditions in order
to isolate the effect of changing group size.
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Table 12: Parameters for Changing Group Size
Consumer Group Size
Group Size 2 Group Size 5 Group Size 10
Consumer Shock
Probability
Consumer Short
Term
Endowment
Consumer Long Term
Endowment
Consumer Gross
Income
Consumer Net
Income
Consumer Short
Term
Payout
Consumer Long Term
Payout
Consumer Mean Rate
of Consumption
Consumer Shock
Multiplier
Consumer Population
All Consumers Visible
Bank Assets Visible
Bank Long Term
Asset Return
Bank Short Term
Asset Return
Bank Count
Bank Operating Cost

Group Size 25

Group Size 100

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

100000

100000

100000

100000

100000

17499.987

17499.987

17499.987

17499.987

17499.987

50000

50000

50000

50000

50000

-82500

-82500

-82500

-82500

-82500

1

1

1

1

1

5.71429

5.71429

5.71429

5.71429

5.71429

0.85

0.85

0.85

0.85

0.85

2
100
FALSE
FALSE

2
100
FALSE
FALSE

2
100

2
100

2
100

6

6

6

6

6

1
1
500000

1
1
500000

1
1
500000

1
1
500000

1
1
500000

FALSE
FALSE

FALSE
FALSE

FALSE
FALSE

Each scenario was executed 500 times using Repast Simphony with Java.110

An alternative set of parameters was initially used, but it did not yield the
expected simulation results. This is due to the fact that the previous scenario did not
create much probability for a panic. Given that the sample size of 500 is relatively
small, the differences resulting from changing the group size could not be realized. A
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During proximity based learning, Consumer A looks at the average liquidity
demands of his neighbors to estimate overall liquidity demand in the system.111 As
group size increases, Consumer A is able to see a larger proportion of the overall
consumer population. Following the law of large numbers, as group size increases,
Consumer A’s estimate of overall liquidity demand should be getting more accurate.
However, liquidity demand in the system is dynamic with respect to the
timing of the proximity based learning.112 If Consumer A chooses to panic, he will
withdraw all of his assets from the bank. His panic and withdrawal increase the
liquidity demand in the system. Given that liquidity demand can increase beyond
initial levels as consumers have the opportunity to learn, this study chose to
compare each consumer’s estimate of the current liquidity level at the point in time
they learned to the actual liquidity level at that same point in time. Thus as group
size increases, this study looked at the differences between consumer estimates of
liquidity demands and the actual liquidity demands at the same points in time.113
The standard deviation of these differences was used to determine how
accurate the consumers’ estimates were. A more accurate set of estimates would
decision was made after the fact to use a more volatile scenario that would clearly
allow for significant differences even in a small sample size.
111 Liquidity demand is determined by either the cash holdings of a consumer
because the consumer had such great liquidity demands he or she needed to
withdraw money from the bank or the consumer’s initial liquidity demand if the
consumer had net positive income and deposited money into the bank.
112 Here, timing refers to the consumer’s place in line to do proximity based
learning. The first consumer to learn is considered to proceed earlier in time than
the last consumer to learn.
113 For example, when if Consumer C is the 52nd person to learn, her estimate of the
liquidity demand is compared to the actual liquidity demand in the system when she
looks (i.e. the actual liquidity demand after 51 other consumers have already
learned).
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have a lower standard deviation in the difference than a less accurate set of
estimates. In this experiment, a group size of 20 consumers would be expected to
yield a lower standard deviation in the estimate differences than a group size of 10
consumers. The actual results are below.
Figure 13: Standard Deviation of Liquidity Demand Estimation Difference vs.
Group Size
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Estimation Difference
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Table 14: Standard Deviation of Liquidity Demand Estimation Difference vs.
Group Size
Standard Deviation of Liquidity Demand Estimation Difference
Group Size 25

2812179.902

Group Size 10

2896585.175

Group Size 5

3166120.97

Group Size 2

3926264.274

All Consumers Visible

0
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The results indicate that as group size increases, the standard deviation
between the consumers’ estimate of the current liquidity demand and the actual
current liquidity demand decreases. This was the expected relationship following
the idea that larger samples should be more representative of the overall system.
This relationship plays out in interesting ways regarding the proportion of panic
which will be discussed later in the section.
When all consumers were visible, during each consumer’s opportunity to
learn, the consumer could see the liquidity demands of the entire system. Thus their
“estimate” actually matched the actual liquidity demand in the system. Thus the
difference between the estimate and actual was always 0 so it had a standard
deviation of 0.
As the group size increases, one would expect to see the standard deviation
of the differences approach 0. However, the data shown do not appear to indicate
that. The reasoning behind this is the nature of the learning process. The process is
coded so that a consumer looks in her surrounding neighborhood of a certain size at
the minimum of either the group size or the number of consumers in her
neighborhood. For example, if her group size is 25 but there are only 10 consumers
in her neighborhood, she will only observe the 10 consumers.
To avoid this constraint, the author could have expanded the consumer’s
neighborhood to include the entire simulation environment. Unfortunately, the
software package used in this simulation process would be greatly slowed by that
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change. Further, that would take away the idea of using geographical proximity as a
proxy for social familiarity. This second point is not so important as the resulting
geographical proximity is random anyway. For further research, expanding the
neighborhood size to the full simulation environment would be an interesting
exercise. With that change, we would almost surely see the standard deviation of the
difference approach 0 as group size reached the population total.
As group size increases, the proportion of unnecessary panics (panics when
the bank is not in an actual failure situation) was expected to decrease.114 An
unnecessary panic occurs when a consumer misestimates the relationship between
the bank’s assets and the overall liquidity demand in the system. The results
regarding the accuracy of consumer liquidity estimates suggests that consumers are
less likely to significantly overestimate liquidity demands as group size increases.
Thus the proportion of panics should decrease due to the decreased chance for
overestimating liquidity demands. However, the other part of the panic condition is
If initial liquidity demands are high enough such that the bank would fail, the
bank is expected fail (in either the current period or the next) regardless of whether
or not any consumers panic. Liquidity demands never go below their initial level as
the learning process only allows for consumers to withdraw more money from the
bank (increasing liquidity demands). The overall cost of a bank failure is unaffected
by the actions of consumers. However, which consumers pay the cost does depend
on consumer actions. Consumer A may incorrectly perceive the system not to be in a
bank failure situation so he will not withdraw his assets when he learns and later
lose all of his assets once the bank does indeed fail. Thus increasing sample size
allows consumers to more accurately diagnose bank failure situations. So with
larger sample sizes, consumers that have the opportunity to withdraw early on (the
first people in line) are more likely to avoid losing their assets in a bank failure as
opposed to consumers at the end of the line that may never have the opportunity to
withdraw assets before the bank fails. In summary, increasing group size in a bank
failure situation does not negatively affect the system but it shifts the burden from
the early learning consumers to the later consumers in line.

114
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the consumer’s estimate of the bank’s assets which is unaffected by group size. This
two part nature of the panic condition led to interesting results regarding the
relationship between group size and proportion of panic. The results are given
below.
Table 15: Proportion of Panic vs. Group Size

Group Size 25
Group Size 10
Group Size 5
Group Size 2
All Consumers Visible

Proportion of Panics
0.367087277
0.397224858
0.413207298
0.469592348
0.646774219
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Figure 16: Proportion of Panic vs. Group Size
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The above results regarding group size and proportion of panics appear to
indicate that the proportion of panics actually does decrease as group size increases.
However, when all consumers are visible, the proportion of panic actually rises
quite significantly. This is due to the problem mentioned above where the decision
to panic is based off of both the estimated liquidity demand and the estimated bank
assets. The idea that the bank asset estimation process is vulnerable to significant
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distortions when the consumer is shocked causes the panic proportion to spike
when all consumers are visible.
If Consumer A is shocked, he is likely to panic regardless of the liquidity
demand in the system because of his estimate of the bank’s assets. If he panics, he
withdraws what remaining assets he has from the bank. This withdrawal increases
the liquidity demands on the entire system. Since all consumers are visible, every
other consumer sees that increased liquidity demand. Thus consumers are
constantly perceiving the increased liquidity demands when consumers panic. If a
significant proportion of consumers are getting shocked, the combination of the
increasing liquidity demands and low estimation of bank assets provides the perfect
conditions for large proportions of bank panics. In the scenario above, 90% of
consumers were expected to be shocked each period so the result above is no longer
so surprising.
Further, bank failures actually occurred 9.1% of the time when all consumers
were visible due to the heavy liquidity demands imposed by consumers panicking.
This was a significantly larger proportion than what occurred under any of the other
group sizes. The bank failure proportions are shown below. Looking deeper into the
actual level of bank assets when consumers panicked revealed that 85.9% of the
panics that occurred when all consumers were visible were unnecessary.115 This is
consistent with the idea that although consumer estimates of the liquidity demand

85.9% is actually a lower bound on the proportion of the panics that were
unnecessary. Data needed to calculate the exact proportion were not recorded.
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were accurate, their inaccurate estimate of the bank’s assets led to a less optimal
outcome than what occurred with smaller group sizes.116
Table 17: Proportion of Bank Failures vs. Group Size

Group Size 2
Group Size 5
Group Size 10
Group Size 25
All Consumers Visible

Proportion of Bank Failure
0.004491452
0.004344678
0.003611673
0.002594782
0.091363724

Overall, the results of this section strongly support that consumer estimates
of the liquidity demand in the system become more accurate as group size increases.
This is beneficial in that consumers are less likely to overestimate liquidity demands
by a significant amount which decreases the likelihood of panics in a non failure
situation. But more accurate liquidity demand estimates alone are not enough to
guarantee better outcomes. Since panicking depends on both liquidity and asset
estimations, depending on the asset estimation process, increasing the group size
could actually be detrimental as we saw when all consumers were visible. Thus the
overall benefit of increasing the information available to consumers regarding
liquidity demands is unclear unless the bank asset estimation process is also
considered.

116

Less optimal refers to the proportion of bank failures in Table 15.
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Bank Transparency
Bank transparency is whether or not consumers are able to directly see the
assets the bank holds.
Results were obtained using the following scenarios in Table 18 below.
Parameters were all kept constant under the stationarity conditions in order to
isolate the effect of changing the bank’s visibility.
Table 18: Parameters for Bank Visibility

Consumer Shock Probability
Consumer Short Term
Endowment
Consumer Long Term
Endowment
Consumer Gross Income
Consumer Net Income
Consumer Short Term Payout
Consumer Long Term Payout
Consumer Mean Rate of
Consumption
Consumer Shock Multiplier
Consumer Population
All Consumers Visible
Bank Long Term Asset Return
Bank Short Term Asset Return
Bank Count
Bank Operating Cost
Consumer Group Size

Bank Assets Visible Bank Assets Not Visible
0.5
0.5
100000

100000

57500
50000
-42500
1.18876
1.73913

57500
50000
-42500
1.18876
1.73913

0.85
2
100

0.85
2
100

FALSE
1.826087
1
1
500000
10

FALSE
1.826087
1
1
500000
10

Each scenario was executed 200 times using Repast Simphony with Java.117

These scenarios were only executed 200 times each due to issues with the Repast
Simphony.

117

89
Consumers base their decision to panic on what they expect the bank’s assets
to be in the next period compared to expected liquidity demands in the next period.
In the general case, consumers are unable to see the actual assets the banks hold.
Consumers instead use ad-hoc expectations to estimate the bank’s assets. For
example, Consumer A could look at his levels of short and long term assets and
estimate that every other consumer has the same levels of assets in the banks. In
this manner, Consumer A can use ad-hoc expectations to estimate the bank’s total
levels of assets.
However, the bank’s assets are dynamic with respect to the timing of
proximity based learning in the same way liquidity demands on the system were
dynamic.118 If Consumer A chooses to panic, he will withdraw all of his assets from
the bank. His withdrawal decreases the amount of assets the bank holds. Given that
bank assets can decrease beyond initial levels after consumers have received their
net incomes, this study chose to compare each consumer’s estimate of the current
bank asset levels at the point in time they learned to the actual bank asset levels at
the same point in time. The standard deviation of these differences was used to
determine how accurate the consumers’ estimates were. A more accurate set of
estimates would have a lower standard deviation in the difference than a less
accurate set of estimates. Given the way bank assets are estimated in the PBLM,
there are only two approaches: either the consumer used ad-hoc expectations or the
consumer could see the bank’s assets. The results are below.

This reasoning is nearly identical to that of the consumer estimation of liquidity
demand.
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Table 19: Standard Deviation of Bank Assets Estimation

Bank Assets Not Visible
Bank Assets Visible

Standard Deviation of Bank Assets Estimation Difference
9280765.07
0

Figure 20: Standard Deviation of Bank Assets Estimation

Standard Deviation of Differences in
Bank Assets Estimation
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8000000
6000000
4000000
2000000
0
Bank Assets Not Visible

Bank Assets Visible

Unsurprisingly, the results indicate that when consumers need to use ad-hoc
expectations to estimate the bank’s current assets, those estimations are very
inaccurate. Much of this inaccuracy comes from the aforementioned distortion when
a consumer is shocked. When the bank’s assets are visible, during each consumer’s
opportunity to learn, the consumer could see the actual bank’s assets so their
“estimate” was completely accurate. Thus the difference between the estimate and
actual was always 0 so it had a standard deviation of 0.
When consumers underestimate the bank’s assets, they are more likely to
panic. This is problematic in a non-failure situation as panicking increases the
overall level of liquidity demands on the banks assets and increases the likelihood of
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others panicking.119 There is also the real cost of panicking and liquidating one’s
long term assets early. Bank transparency eliminates underestimating bank assets,
so we would expect to see the proportion of panics be smaller when there is bank
transparency as opposed to when there is not transparency. The results showing the
proportion of panics and bank failures are below.
Table 21: Proportion of Panics and Bank Failures vs. Bank Visibility
Bank Assets Not Visible
Bank Assets Visible

Proportion of Panics
0.288984735
0.004627257

Proportion of Bank Failures
0
0.000714286

These results indicate that consumers misestimating (underestimating) the
bank’s assets were largely responsible for unnecessary panics. Although these
results came from one scenario of parameters and a relatively small sample size, the
difference between the proportions of panics when the bank assets were not visible
and when they were visible show how poor consumers’ ad-hoc expectations of bank
assets are. Bank transparency has effect where consumers that are shocked are no
longer extremely likely to panic simply by merit of being shocked. Removing this
distortion is why the proportion of panics decreased so dramatically when bank
assets became visible.
These results indicate that the consumer’s ad-hoc expectations for bank
assets are easily distorted and responsible for a large proportion of unnecessary
In bank failure situations, bank transparency has no overall effect as it does not
change the magnitude of the loss due to a bank failure. It merely affects the
distribution of that loss (some consumers might have incorrectly not withdrawn
assets when they had the opportunity to due to overestimating bank assets) but
since the bank is in a failure situation, the overall cost is inevitable.
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panics. However, the economic intuition behind this estimation process is still not
unreasonable, especially in the face of no clear alternatives. Under the fair
assumption that each consumer only knows his or her own level of assets and that
all consumers are expected to have the same level of assets, the ad-hoc expectation
process is logical albeit easily capable of being distorted.
Bank transparency eliminates the consequences of overestimating bank
assets (there are none in non-failure situations) and underestimating assets (there
are plenty in non-failure situations). Thus in non-bank failure situations, bank
transparency decreases the probability of costly unnecessary bank panics. The
simulation results indicate this is likely a very significant decrease. Based on these
results, it is clear that poor consumer estimations of bank assets are responsible for
a large proportion of unnecessary panics in the PBLM. To rectify this issue, banks
should consider making their assets more visible to avoid consumers from
underestimating the bank’s assets and panicking.120

The author reaches this conclusion based solely on the simulation results. It is
quite possible that banks may want to avoid making their assets visible for
competitive or privacy reasons.
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Bank Transparency and Consumer Visibility
Bank transparency is whether or not consumers are able to directly see the
assets the bank holds. Complete consumer visibility is whether or not during the
learning phase consumers can see the liquidity demands of all other consumers.
Results were obtained using the following scenarios. Parameters were all
kept constant under the stationarity conditions in order to isolate the effect of
changing the bank’s visibility.
Table 22: Parameters for Bank Transparency and Consumer Visibility

Consumer Shock Probability
Consumer Short Term Endowment
Consumer Long Term Endowment
Consumer Gross Income
Consumer Net Income
Consumer Short Term Payout
Consumer Long Term Payout
Consumer Mean Rate of
Consumption
Consumer Shock Multiplier
Consumer Population
Bank Long Term Asset Return
Bank Short Term Asset Return
Bank Count
Bank Operating Cost
Consumer Group Size

Bank Assets Visible and
Bank Assets Not Visible
All Consumers Visible
and Group Size = 10
0.5
0.5
100000
100000
57500
57500
50000
50000
-42500
-42500
1.18876
1.18876
1.73913
1.73913
0.85

0.85

2
100
1.826087
1
1
500000
N/A

2
100
1.826087
1
1
500000
10

Each scenario was executed 200 times using Repast Simphony with Java.121

These scenarios were only executed 200 times each due to issues with the Repast
Simphony.
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Consumers are now able to view the bank’s actual assets and see the liquidity
demands of all consumers when they learn now. This scenario combines the
previous conditions of bank transparency and complete consumer visibility.
Consequently consumers no longer need to use ad-hoc expectations anymore. The
differences between bank asset and liquidity demand estimates are always 0 now.
For the sake of comparison, these results will be displayed next to results obtained
using the same parameters but without both complete consumer visibility and bank
asset visibility. The results are below.
Figure 23: Standard Deviation of Estimation Differences vs. Visibility
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Table 24: Standard Deviation of Estimation Differences vs. Visibility
Standard Deviation of Liquidity Demand
Estimation Difference
Bank and Consumer
Visibility
No Bank Visibility and
Group Size = 10

Standard Deviation of Bank Assets
Estimation Difference
0

0

1670744

9278488

The results indicate that with bank and consumer visibility, consumers are
much better at “estimating” as opposed to when consumers lack that visibility. With
visibility, it is now expected that no unnecessary panics should occur. This is the
same situation as the DD model where either all consumers panic or none of them
do because they all act on the same information. The results regarding panic
proportion are below.
Figure 25: Proportion of Panic vs. Visibility

Proportion of Panic vs. Visibility
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0.2
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0
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No Bank Visibility and Group Size = 10
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Table 26: Proportion of Panic vs. Visibility

Bank and Consumer Visibility
No Bank Visibility and Group Size = 10

0
0.288456471

Under both scenarios, no bank failures occurred. Hence all panics were
unnecessary panics. Given that unnecessary panics do not occur with visibility, it is
unsurprising that the panic proportion for visibility was 0. The panic proportion
without visibility was 0.288. As mentioned throughout this paper, there is a real cost
associated with panics. Diamond and Dybvig define it as the cost of recalling loans
and interrupting production.122 There is also the real penalty associated with
liquidating one’s assets early. Thus panicking is costly and should be avoided unless
it is necessary. With bank visibility and consumer visibility, the proportion of
unnecessary panics was and will be 0. This means all the costs associated with
unnecessary panics are avoided with better visibility. In order to reduce costs
associated with unnecessary bank failures, this study suggests the banking system
be as transparent as possible about the bank’s assets and liquidity demands.
Increasing group size was found to be an effective way to increase the
accuracy of consumer estimates regarding the liquidity demands in the system.
Unfortunately this study was unable to explore any effective ways to increase the
accuracy of bank asset estimates aside from allowing consumers to directly see the
bank’s assets. Several alternatives to the ad-hoc expectation process of bank assets
are discussed in the Distortions subsection of the Proximity Based Learning section.

122

DD p.404
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Identifying ways to allow consumers to more accurately perceive the actual
holdings of the bank without infringing on privacy or competitive concerns is key in
preventing unnecessary panics.
Interestingly, the optimal scenario of bank and consumer visibility is the
same scenario that this study criticizes for being unrealistic. In practice, this
scenario still is impractical. The whole basis for proximity based learning is the
assumption that consumers only have access to limited information on the system.
However, these results indicate that unnecessary panics are the result of consumers
receiving information that does not accurately reflect the state of the system. Thus
providing avenues for consumers to understand that the system is not in a failure
situation is very helpful in discouraging false panics.

Conclusion
Place in Line
The analysis of these results supports that proximity based learning is an
effective form of communication. As a consumer’s place in line increases, the
likelihood of the consumer panicking also increases. This relationship is
representative of panics leading to more panic as expected in the theoretical model.
Magnitude of Net Income
The analysis of these results supports the mathematical tipping point
analysis where as the magnitude of net income increases, the tipping point average
withdrawal becomes closer to the expected average withdrawal. As the two
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approach each other, it becomes increasingly likely that the actual average
withdrawal could exceed the tipping point and cause consumers to panic and the
bank to fail. This result was consistent with Honohan’s (2000) work which found
smaller economies with less capital were at greater risk of bank failure than
developed economies.
Changing αc
The analysis supports that as the liquidity provided by the bank increases (as
αc increases relative to αb), the probability of both panics and bank failures increase.
This is the expected theoretical relationship found in the DD, Pauzner and Goldstein,
and Chari and Jagannathan.
Changing Group Size
The analysis supports that as group size increases, consumers see more
accurate information regarding the liquidity demands on the overall system. This is
the expected relationship under the law of large numbers. It was interesting to note
that although this relationship holds, the proportion of panics does not necessarily
decrease, as the panic condition is also dependent on consumer estimates of the
bank’s assets.
Bank Visibility
The analysis supported that when consumers could see the bank’s assets,
their estimates of the bank’s assets matched the actual values. This result was
unsurprising. However, these data revealed how the ad-hoc expectations of the
bank’s assets can be severely distorted when a shocked consumer uses his own
shock-depleted assets as the expected per-capita holdings of the bank. Several
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alternatives to prevent this distortion should be explored in future research
including using a weighted average of a consumer’s past asset levels and allowing
the consumer to view the assets of other consumers so as to increase the sample
size. This distortion effect is not clearly a problem intuitively, but for experimental
purposes alternatives should at least be considered.
Bank Transparency and Consumer Visibility
The analysis supported that consumers were now able to perfectly estimate
the bank’s assets and overall liquidity demands on the system. The results actually
indicated this was the most optimal scenario as it completely eliminated any
unnecessary panics. This is also the most unrealistic scenario as privacy and
competitive concerns would likely prevent banks from revealing their assets and
prevent consumers from sharing their liquidity needs with all other consumers, not
just the consumers they were socially proximal to. It also removes any need for
proximity based learning as this is the standard DD case.

The data support all the expected theoretical relationships. Thus proximity
based learning is a concept that should be considered for any future research
regarding the panic transmission process for any models that build off of the DD
framework.
In general, bank panics in the PBLM were largely a result of consumers acting
on incorrect limited information. The probability of unnecessary panics could be
significantly decreased by making banks more transparent about the assets they
hold and the liquidity demands they face. This is a significant solution because if the
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probability of an actual bank failure based on expected withdrawals is low, “the only
thing we have to fear is fear itself."123,124
The PBLM is not a perfect model. Stationarity in assets was important in
keeping expected tipping points constant over time. Unfortunately true stationarity
could not be achieved due to the circular issue where a stationary system should
account for the expected loss due to a bank failure, but calculating that expected loss
requires knowing the probability of bank panics and failures in a stationary system.
There was also the issue of debt forgiveness that makes asset growth tend positive.
Thus all results should be taken with the caveat that stationarity in assets may or
may not exist.
Regardless of whether or not stationarity holds, it is the firm belief of the
author that proximity based learning is an effective method of communication and a
more reasonable assumption of what information is available to consumers as
opposed to the perfect visibility in the DD model. The PBLM lays the foundation for
future research regarding the panic transmission process.

123
124

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933).
Given that panics can cascade and cause a strong system to fail.
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